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The goal of this thesis is to address what I believe to be an all too frequent misun-
derstanding. This is the idea that religion generally and Islamic extremism 
specifically is the primary foundation for suicide terrorism in Iraq. Because of the 
social and historical demographics of Iraq, I argue that it is necessary to under-
stand Iraqi suicide bombings as a variety of di erent concurrent movements as 
opposed to one monolithic phenomenon. Furthermore, it is my assertion that the 
connection between suicide attacks and Islam has been exaggerated within Ameri-
can public discourse. This discourse has lead to a large and varied body of rhetoric 
that professes an intimate connection between Islam and violence.  
It is not my intention to argue that the relationship between suicide bombers 
and Islam is purely fallacious. Politicized Islam has achieved a rather high degree 
of popularity in the Middle East and one would be mistaken if one presupposed 
that there were no suicide bombers who were strict Islamic adherents. It will be 
contended therefore that Islam is an element in the propagation of the phenome-
non of suicide bombings. However, religion is neither essential nor su icient for 




By mixing religious militants like al-Qaeda together with secular rogue states like 
Iraq, the doctrine of President George W. Bush has over simplified U.S. under-
standings of Muslims and the Middle East. Before the current U.S. occupation of 
Iraq, the president claimed that there were strong ties between al-Qaeda and Iraq. 
He said that he believed that Iraq was involved in the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11th 2001 but that he did not have “the evidence” to link Osama bin Laden 
with Saddam Hussein.1 President Bush claimed that the al-Qaeda network operat-
ed out of a framework of an ideological and religious confrontation with the West 
rather than through the framework of an individual conflict. Of militant Muslims 
he said, “Why do they hate us? ... They hate our freedoms—our freedom of reli-
gion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemblage.”2 However, by 
not clearly defining who “they” are, ambiguity has allowed Americans to under-
stand any number of Muslim groups, including Muslims as a whole, to be dan-
gerous—with an a nity for violence. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 therefore 
represented to the average American how very di erent Islam and the Middle East 
are from the “secular” West. The onset of suicide bombers in Iraq has only served 
to deepen those culturally bound assertions.  
A practical assessment of the role of religion in conflict cannot be restricted to 
rudimentary cause-e ect equations. Instead, the scientific study of religion should 
be used to contribute a nuanced approach to how religion adds to other explana-
tory variables in conflict. What do we mean by religion? Confronting this com-
plex question must involve a multifaceted approach. One way in which this ques-
tion will be responded to will be by focusing on the role religion has played in 
moments of violent conflict. Contemporary events where religion has been mixed 
with violence in Iraq will be of particular interest. Also, religion will be ap-
proached as a relational construction. It o ers practitioners the possibility of form-
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ing profound ties with communities, gods, ancestors, and symbols. This ap-
proach exposes the reader to the fact that the bonds that constitute religion are 
often ambiguous. Therefore, this thesis will not be arguing for a Western concep-
tion of privatized religion. Notions of compartmentalizing religion and relegating 
it to the private sphere reduce religion’s relevance since it functions on so many 
levels.  
This thesis represents my attempt to understand the character of religion in 
conflict. I will venture to name the central components of violence in religion and 
detail the relation of religion to other facets of culture. Specifically, this paper will 
assess the record of Islam and suicide terrorism. My examples are drawn from both 
a historical ideological lineage and from Iraqi Muslim history in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. It is my hope that a broad analysis of religion in the history 
and causes of suicide terrorism can enable academics, policymakers and the na-
tional security establishment to ground policies in real knowledge. Meaningful 
understanding by U.S. security professionals of the roles that religion plays in in-
ternational security can save lives in the short term and contribute to peace build-
ing initiatives in the long term. This paper situates suicide bombings in their cul-
tural, economic, political, and religious context. This is imperative because 
security o icials and policymakers alike must understand how conflicts in the 
contemporary global world are—and are not—religious.  
A main point of this paper will be to address what I believe to be a frequent 
misunderstanding. This is the idea that religion generally and Islamic extremism 
specifically are the primary foundation for suicide terrorism. Political pundits such 
as Brigitte Gabriel and Daniel Pipes maintain that Muslims are provided by their 
religious tradition with an irrational mental status.3 They claim this is necessary to 
execute a suicide attack and that the predisposition of many Iraqi Imams to 
deemphasize secular societal constructions of right and wrong is particularly ap-
pealing to those who end up killing other human beings. One may perhaps pre-
suppose the such arguments are defensible from a wholly deductive standpoint, in 
                                                 
3  The fullest discussions by these two thinkers can be found on their individual 
websites: Gabriel’s website is  http://www.americancongressfortruth.com/ 
;while Pipes’ website is located at http://www.danielpipes.org/.     
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that they reflect beliefs and actions of Muslim suicide bombers. Undeniably, sui-
cide bombers in Iraq are faced with the horrendous assignment of killing other 
human beings and, seeing themselves as soldiers, are eager to do their part in 
fighting a war. However, those who take such a stance pay little account to the 
historical development of suicide bombers in Iraq or to the complexities of the 
political aspect of Islam. It is my assertion that the connection between suicide 
attacks and Islam is exaggerated because Westerners want a simplistic solution for 
avoiding future 9/11s. It is far easier to believe that one can stop violence merely 
by the transformation of Muslim culture than it is to believe that one has to take a 
comprehensive approach just to begin to address cultural conflict. People who 
base their beliefs upon such problematic arguments e ectively advance the disse-
mination of misinformation, leading to a large and varied body of rhetoric that 
posits an intimate connection between Islam and violence.  
It should be stated from the outset that it is not my intention to argue that the 
relationship between suicide bombers and Islam is purely fallacious. Politicized 
Islam has achieved a rather high degree of popularity in the Middle East and one 
would be mistaken if one presupposed that there were no suicide bombers who 
adopted Islamist practices, Islamism is being defined here in its most basic sense as 
Islam narrowed down to an ideology. Iraqi suicide bombers are from all parts of 
society like other citizens, and their religious practices coincide with the social at-
titudes towards Islam that dominate the Iraqi populace in any given place. In oth-
er words, suicide bombers in Iraq are no more and no less religious than other in-
dividuals. In fact, there are interviews with failed suicide bombers who claim to be 
everything from devout believers to being not religious at all.4 Thus, those who 
claim some intimate connection between Islam and suicide bombers are not 
wrong in every instance. However, these American politicians and security o icials 
have used these basic associations to construct an unbalanced foundation for their 
argument that suicide bombers have some special a inity to Islamic ideology or 
that Islamism is the de facto form of Islam to which suicide bombers subscribe. It 
is this misrepresentation or misunderstanding and the creation of tangential asso-
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ciations between suicide bombers and Islam that will be a major focus of this 
thesis. This thesis will also focus on the ways that Islam and Islamism do a ect the 
suicide bomber phenomenon. It is important to think about how various forms of 
Islam have sought to upset the status quo in Iraq in order to better understand the 
rhetoric and political trends that coincide with the phenomena of suicide bomb-
ers. Because of the social and historical demographics of Iraq, I argue that it is ne-
cessary to understand Iraqi suicide bombings as a variety of di erent concurrent 
movements as opposed to one monolithic phenomenon. Suicide bombings have 
been reduced to a product of religion in American discourse. This thesis seeks to 
fissure such arguments and construct a more accurate depiction of the roles that 
religion provides in suicide attacks.  
In many ways, my arguments do not depart from the mainstream of contem-
porary scholarship on the topics of Arab terrorism and religious studies. There are 
those who have touched on the topic of suicide bombers’ religious practices or on 
the problem centered approach of scholarship which has to dispel common falsi-
ties regarding the practice of Islamic traditions and explain what Islam isn’t before 
it can explain what Islam is.5 However, most scholars deal with this issue as an ex-
tension of a separate argument, such as solely a security-centric variable in interna-
tional relations, or during investigations of religious militancy. These scholars 
normally do not expound on the topic at any great length. Regardless, the myth of 
a connection between Islam and violence as the exclusive contributory factor in 
suicide attacks is still very much alive among those who are not specialists in the 
area of Middle Eastern studies or Islam.  
Methodology 
Writing this thesis has not been without its di iculties. The first and most appar-
ent problem is the fact that my Arabic is limited. Obviously, Arab culture has un-
dergone significant changes which allow for English translations of many of the 
primary sources which may be of interest to our research. Indeed, even those elec-
tronic sources that are not translated can be understood with the use of language 
                                                 
5  Capan, Ergun. Ed. An Islamic Perspective: Terror and Suicide Attacks. (New 
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software. Nonetheless, language is an issue that can ease or hamper any 
gation.  
One must also recognize the fact that suicide bombers in Iraq have emerged as 
a reaction to the status quo since 2003. Although many historians begin their in-
vestigation of these phenomena only in light of America’s recent postwar invasion, 
it is important to investigate and understand the social, political, and religious 
issues both within the country and throughout the region within a context of 
Arab and Islamic culture and not see such actions simply as a reaction to Western 
occupation and interference. Suicide bombers are a type of ideological mercenary 
who, while sometimes sacrificing themselves for nationalist or religious reasons, 
are members of small cells that recruit and maintain suicide bombers for any 
number of reasons. Therefore, in order to get a clearer and superior understanding 
of the frameworks in which suicide bombers operate, one must investigate pre-
invasion issues along with the postwar invasion issues.  
My investigation will require a reexamination of the relationship between Is-
lam and the suicide bomber, a relationship it must be understood which has only 
existed for a short period of time. In order to address the historical development 
of Iraqi suicide bombers and an Iraqi political form of Islam, I have divided this 
thesis into five major chapters. The first chapter will focus on how Islam has been 
equated with violence in American popular, political, and military discourse. I will 
argue that it is Western analysts and media who, writing from a standpoint that 
tends to homogenize Muslims and Islamic practice, have helped create the image 
of the Islamist suicide bomber and propagated this image to other cultures, lead-
ing to the popular notion that suicide bombers are strict Islamic adherents. The 
second chapter will deal with the rhetorical relationships between Middle Eastern 
governments and Islamist thinkers prior to the rise of suicide attacks in the early 
1980s. I will argue that the alliances created between emerging Islamist schools are 
not an indication of any extraordinary religious fervor on the part of Islamist arc-
hitects and followers, but represented a style of communication and association 
between religious groups and government that filled a void left by failed ideologies 
such as Marxism, Secularism and Arab nationalism. The third chapter will ex-
amine the politics of religious persecution in Iraq. I will argue that events within 
this sphere of understanding have led to the romantic notion of a suicide bomber 
 ix
such as having absolute devotion to Allah, selflessness, and deep religious 
viction. It has only been after the disintegration of a unitary government and with 
the rise of sectarianism that we see the emergence of the suicide bomber as a truly 
distinctive icon, an image that would capture the imagination of the media. The 
fourth and arguably most important chapter will deal with the rise of suicide 
bombings in Iraq since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The fifth and final chapter 
will conclude my work and summarize up my arguments.  
 x
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Popular American Discourses on Islam and Violence  
Violence is a recurrent theme in American popular notions of Muslim politics. 
Suicide bombings are viewed as a chief component of modern Muslim-Western 
engagements. Americans imagine militant Muslims being suicide bombers to the 
point that this understanding has achieved normative status. As with all informa-
tion, there are elements of truth to such an idea. However, acceptable analysis ne-
cessitates a fuller examination of the contexts in which suicide bombers operate. 
Additionally, it is necessary to understand what kinds of rhetoric about religion’s 
role in suicide bombings are advanced in popular, security, and military discourse. 
This chapter will review some American notions of Islam and violence in order to 
understand how Iraqi suicide bombings have come to be seen as a religiously in-
spired movement.  
1.1 Discourse Analysis  
The discourse on suicide bombers presented in this chapter articulates certain 
worldviews which rest on particular assumptions and beliefs. Language is thus the 
focal point of this chapter’s analysis, taking as a starting point the general idea that 
language is structured according to di erent patterns, and that it is in the concrete 
use of language that such patterns are created, reproduced, and changed. Dis-
course analysis is the analysis of language patterns. However, as Jørgensen and 
Phillips argue, discourse analysis is a heterogeneous field—that is, it is not just one 
approach but rather a series of inter-disciplinary approaches. It can be applied to 
various social domains in several di erent types of studies including the discipline 
of religious studies.6  
                                                 
6  Jorgensen, Marianne W. and Louise J Phillips. Discourse Analysis as Theory 
and Method. (New York: Sage Publications, 2002) 1 
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In discourse analysis, theory and method are inter-twined. This implies that 
researchers have to accept a ‘complete package’ which includes four elements: 
epistemology; theoretical models; methodological guidelines; and specific tech-
niques for analysis (methods).7 This means that discourse analysis cannot just be 
applied as a method for analyzing data, in a more technical sense, but it has to be 
viewed as a theoretical and methodological whole.8 The categories and representa-
tions that people use to understand the world are historically and culturally 
specific.9 The term ‘discourse’ is used abstractly for ‘the general domain of state-
ments’ and more specifically for ‘groups of statements’ or for the ‘regulated prac-
tice’, meaning the rules that govern such a group of statements. In Construction-
ism, truth is regarded as a discursive construct and di erent regimes of knowledge 
establish what is true and false. Foucault defines discourse as: 
[A] group of statements in so far as they belong to 
the same discursive formation… Discourse is made 
up of a limited number of statements for which a 
group of conditions of existence can be defined. 
Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless 
form… it is, from the beginning to end, historical 
– a fragment of history… posing its own limits, its 
divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of 
its temporality.10 
This chapter will follow Jørgensen and Phillips’ preliminary definition of dis-
course, understood “as a particular way of talking about and understanding the 
world (or aspects of the world).”11 Here, information that is transmitted is not 
seen as neutrally reflecting our world, identities, and social relations. Rather, 
                                                 
7  Ibid, 3 
8  Jorgensen, 4 
9  Burr, Vivien. Social Constructionism. (New York: Routledge, 2003) 3-4  
10  Jorgensen, 12 
11  Jorgensen, 1 
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people’s ways of understanding have an active role in creating and changing the 
image people have of our world, identities, and social relations. Interpreting the 
world relates to the view that discourses are to be seen as ways of representing as-
pects of the world while di erent knowledge claims struggle to appear as the un-
derstanding of the world. The interest here is how categories and perspectives are 
discursively constructed. The categories and perspectives focused on in this chap-
ter are mainly related to how Americans categorize terms related to religion, Islam, 
violence, and Iraq. This includes an examination of the discursive practices and 
range of discourses that Americans employ in their everyday practice and the way 
in which these practices and discourses reflect values and attitudes to meaning, 
power, and the use of knowledge and assigning illegitimacy to particular actions 
such as suicidal attacks.  
1.2 Qualitative Content Analysis  
The empirical material analyzed in this chapter consists of written documents 
which contain concepts, beliefs, and understandings. When analyzing documents 
such as these it is possible to approach the material either in a qualitative or a 
quantitative manner. Within these two main categories there are a multitude of 
di erent methodologies, but generally speaking it is possible to talk of quantitative 
approaches and qualitative approaches. A general point is that quantitative strate-
gies have their strength in their structured approach and their ability to make sta-
tistical generalizations. More to the point, these approaches take their starting 
point in the positivistic tradition where the ideal is that social sciences can and 
should use the same criteria for knowledge production as natural sciences. At the 
base of this view of science is the belief that it is possible to establish an absolute 
distinction between fact and value. In the qualitative approaches, however, these 
ideas are seen as problematic. The critique is that one cannot view the social world 
in terms of a fact-value distinction.12 
Narrowing these approaches down to two strategies for analyzing documents, 
the choice is between quantitative or qualitative content analysis. Again, there are 
                                                 
12  Crotty, Michael J. The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective 
in the Research Process. (New York: Sage Publications, 1998) 12 
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several distinctive methodologies within these two strategies. Here I want to point 
out that the choice between undertaking qualitative and quantitative research oc-
curs at the level of methods. It does not occur at the level of epistemology or theo-
retical perspective, so it is, for example, possible to start from a constructionist 
epistemology and choose a quantitative method.13 Therefore, even though I reject 
positivism as an ideal in social science, this does not mean that I reject all quantit-
ative methods. In this particular work, however, my choice of method was guided 
by my general interest in how violence in Iraq was discursively constructed in the 
United States. Therefore, I have chosen qualitative content analysis as the best 
process for reviewing this chapter’s material. 
Qualitative content analysis can be understood as an expanding process be-
tween an overall understanding of the empirical material and specific textual anal-
ysis. I started with research “buzzwords” and selected potentially relevant docu-
ments for analysis. In the course of analysis, some concepts stood out as more 
relevant than others and throughout the project there was a need to evaluate the 
relevance of di erent perceptions and understandings. In qualitative content anal-
ysis, an important point is that the texts are not viewed as standing on their own. 
The context always matters in analysis. The broader context in this thesis is that 
the concepts analyzed are constructions of an imagined space within the Middle 
East and its key violent actors within said space, and that they all relate to a con-
structed ‘war on terrorism’ as a response to violence in Iraq. The context of the 
individual texts will be discussed in the analysis.  
1.3 Islam in American Popular Discourse 
Negative sentiments about Islam in popular discourse have surged in the United 
States since September 11th, 2001. This antagonistic national attitude has been 
facilitated by the American media. The media have labeled Muslim culture in a 
stereotyped and negative way which has resulted in the creation of “folk devils.”14 
                                                 
13  Crotty, 14 
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(New York: Rutledge, 2002)  
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These “devils” and their activities have been reported in such as way as to create 
moral panic. Panic occurs when a condition, episode, person, or group is defined 
as a threat to societal values and interests.15 The media’s role in structuring the cur-
rent public awareness is vitally important: amplifying the problem, the media have 
created a social reaction against Muslims and Islam; they have galvanized aware-
ness and alarm. The simplified and exaggerated facts have scared the public and 
fostered the stereotypes.  
It is arguable that without moral panics, suicide bombings may never have be-
come as prolific as they have in Iraq. Without wide media coverage, possible 
emerging terrorist groups, who have falsely claimed credit for suicide attacks to 
improve their prestige, may never have been tempted to make such claims in the 
first place. Therefore, any retaliatory attacks may never have taken place. The me-
dia consequently not only distort contemporary reality but they also condition 
future reality.16 Furthermore, the American media have also been responsible for 
the reinvigoration of what Tom Engelhardt calls “victory culture”17 in the United 
States. By framing the conflict in Iraq as “civilization against barbarism” and as 
“good against evil,” the media have given Americans the clarity and confidence of 
a country mobilized for an “us or them” struggle. In order to better understand 
how Americans perceive suicide bombers and Islam, it is important to briefly in-
vestigate American religiosity.  
Religion is a ubiquitous component of the American experience. Ninety-five 
percent of Americans indicate that they believe in some sort of God or Higher 
Power whereas only 5% claim to be atheist or agnostic.18 Approximately 40% of 
                                                 
15  Ibid  
16  Ibid 
17  Englehardt, Tom. The End of Victory Culture. (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1995)  
18  Forbes, Bruce David. and Jeffery H. Mahan. Eds. Religion and Popular 
Culture In America. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 2005) 7  
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the United States population reports attending worship in any given week.19 Reli-
gion can be perceived at numerous levels but it is arguable that the most recogniz-
able form is institutional religion. Therefore, religion can be defined in a very 
broad and inclusive way, or it can be used in a narrower approach to refer to hu-
man expressions which are closer to traditional religions. How Islam is understood 
in American popular discourse is also perceived on numerous levels. Somewhere 
in this imagined Islam, the suicide bomber has come to be equated with an “Is-
lamic” form of expression. This figure is imagined by millions of Americans as a 
Muslim religious actor. Such a figure signals both a religious and political threat to 
many Judeo-Christians in America.  
The icon of the suicide bomber demonstrates how American representations 
of Muslims rea rm certain racist notions of the Middle Eastern “other.” It is un-
deniably important to analyze the icon of the suicide bomber within the pheno-
menon of Orientalism—as part of an orientalist network of representations. As a 
created body of theory and practice, Orientalism divides the world into “two un-
equal halves, Orient and Occident.”20 Its “detailed logic is governed not simply by 
empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projec-
tions.”21 Consequently, rather than o ering a clear and unbiased representation of 
Islam, this system of representation reveals the interests and concerns of the Occi-
dental subjectivity from which it emerges.22   
The suicide bomber, depicted within this network of representations, includes 
within its scope a wide range of religious and political figures (Muslims Extrem-
ists, Nationalists, Jihadists, Secularists) from a variety of backgrounds (Iraqi, Ira-
nian, Saudi Arabian, Arab, Persian). Even though such variety points to a diverse 
assemblage, they are homogenized within American popular discourse and con-
sciousness. Orientalism serves to blur the individuality of particular figures. In 
                                                 
19  Ibid 
20  Said, Edward. Orientalism. (New York: Vantage Books, 1979) 203  
21  Said, 12  
22  Ibid  
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fact, American recognition of any suicide bomber in Iraq is predicated on their 
fitting assigned roles and relationships paradigmatically recapitulated in the icon 
of the suicide bomber: his or her strict Islamic adherence and his or her loyalty to 
al-Qaeda.  
Al-Qaeda’s rhetoric, too, has claimed an ideological and religious rather than 
individual confrontation with the United States. This rhetoric has been dissemi-
nated through the American news media and is interpreted di erently due to geo-
graphical, cultural, and religious di erences. The news media have constructed, as 
a narrative device, a “militant Islam” as the single understood vehicle of the Islam-
ic tradition and it has done so by combining Islamic belief and militant politics 
into a violent expression. Before 9/11, the United States media already interpreted 
the Middle East from a reductionist standpoint.  As an example, for the hegemon-
ic West, “what had been understood, albeit incorrectly, as ‘the Arab world’ in the 
1960s and 1970s became, again, incorrectly, ‘the Islamic world’ in the 1980s.”23 
Therefore, the American media have caused violence in Iraq to be framed as a war 
of the religious against the wider, “secular” world.  
1.4 The Role of Media in Iraq 
Mainstream news agencies rely on government and military o icials for informa-
tion on military conflicts such as the current Iraq War. Thus global news media 
have become channels for propaganda and the facilitators for elite sources to set 
the agenda for national and global audiences. These elite sources include govern-
ment policymakers, security o icials, and terrorist networks. Coverage of Iraq is 
consequently framed by international news agencies, especially Western media 
from the U.S. and Britain. News values, globalization, economic interdependence, 
news flows, and propaganda are all highly significant factors a ecting coverage. 
Dominance of the global news agencies by American media has allowed various 
Western constructs to become the main content providers of Iraq’s war coverage as 
well as in depicting Iraq’s communities, culture, and religions.  
                                                 
23  McAlister, Melani. Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the 
Middle East, 1945-2000. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 200 
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The method of “embedding”24 journalists in the Occupational Force’s military 
units is one of the U.S. government’s main strategies to control information com-
ing from Iraq. This strategy replaced the “pool system,” adopted since the Vietnam 
War and used in the Gulf War, where journalists had been grouped and headed by 
the military. In the past, media coverage was censored and no access was given to 
actual conflict. However, in accordance with the embedding strategy, journalists 
are working in concert with the troops and can report in a relatively unrestricted 
manner.25 This new form of journalism has only become possible thanks to the 
new digital technology which allows real-time broadcasting of war reports. The 
military’s calculated intention here has been to enhance the reporters’ credibility 
by enabling them to be at the scene of hostilities. This allows the audience to ac-
cept America’s capability to deter conflict as well as creating an impression of the 
army’s invulnerability. Images taken by the embedded journalists have been rife 
with weapons.26 The very presence of civilian journalists has testified to the Amer-
ican army’s invulnerability. To be among their ranks is to be in a safe place. A 
study of German and American print media coverage shows that the German me-
dia’s assessment of the strategy of embedded journalism has been more critical 
than that of its American counterparts.27 It added that the closer a particular me-
dia outlet is to the left wing of the political spectrum, the more critical the presen-
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tation of embedding becomes. This reveals strong national and political bias in 
war coverage on the media’s part.  
Understanding Western media operations is paralleled by observing Arab sa-
tellite TV station al-Jazeera. Its far-reaching presence during the Iraq War has 
raised interest in general conditions of media production in the Arab world. The 
emergence of internationally influential and somewhat politically independent 
satellite television channels in the Middle East has led to a regional change where 
previous monopolists such as Reuters, the BBC, the AP and CNN are now being 
ignored by local audiences in favor of Arab media. Olivier Hahn reasons that in 
the Middle East there is a “trend towards extreme politicization, polarization, per-
sonalization and emotionalization” which can be observed, especially at al-Jazeera, 
along with a cultural, i.e. pro-Arab, bias.28 In this respect, the Arab channels do 
not di er from their American counterparts CNN and FOX News. Their pro-
grams are instilled with a mixture of journalism and patriotism — merely from a 
pro-Arab standpoint.  
As an analysis of their history and structure shows, the satellite channels of the 
Middle East are frontier runners between journalistic cultures.29 On the one hand, 
they follow ideals of objectivity of the Western tradition of journalism. Al-Jazeera 
has even responded to Western criticism of its media coverage by creating a code 
of ethics.30 However, in spite of their journalistic ideals, these stations are still 
largely dependent economically on their respective state governments. As far as 
conflict in Iraq goes, such Arab television stations might be expected to o er a 
wider variety of views from the Middle East as well as for sources of Iraqi conflict. 
Yet they only slightly enhance the analytical quality of global media coverage.31 
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This is because the e ects of Arab media are predominantly understood in terms 
of their reception by the media in other parts of the world—primarily in indu-
strialized countries. Therefore, Arab media in general and the Iraqi media 
specifically would only influence Americans if they had a hegemonic ability to dis-
seminate their coverage. At this time these outlets are lacking such ability. It is for 
this reason that I argue that how the Iraqi media portrays Iraqi suicide bombers 
and Iraqi conflict is inconsequential for American audiences overall because Amer-
icans are rarely if ever exposed to those representations. Iraqi media do not have a 
great e ect on American discourses on suicide bombers.  
1.5 The Secularization Narrative  
One of the ways that the iconic suicide bomber has made his debut in American 
discourse was through American media coverage including 24-hour television 
news, widespread print coverage, and internet based reporting. Diverse media 
sources served as platforms for the presentation and dissemination of what are 
now monolithic views in the public domain. An example of this print coverage is 
an article from the October 28, 2003 edition of Newsweek magazine which de-
picted the emergence of suicide bombers in Iraq as the work of religious Islamists 
fighting against the onset of secularization in Iraq.32 Within the framework of an 
“us against them” perception, secularization became depicted as the antithesis to 
the suicide bomber in this work by Newsweek and countless others. The article 
states that “foreign Islamists resorting to suicide tactics could pose an increasing 
threat against military and civilian targets alike.”33 It asserts that fighters are com-
ing from all over the Middle East to fight o  Western occupation and seculariza-
tion.  
The term “secular” can be traced back to the Roman Empire when it was first 
used in relation to laws governing the Catholic Church. The Church needed some 
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way of distinguishing the sacred from the commonplace and the term secular was 
used to describe priests who worked outside the church.34 The meaning of this 
term has grown beyond this early definition and is now employed as a social con-
cept that describes the relation between business and politics in the institution of 
religion. Secularization is often seen as synonymous with modernization in its 
push toward industry and capitalism which, some have argued, has resulted in the 
worldwide decline of religion. Modern sociologists of religion have continued to 
address the issue of secularization and I am providing a brief overview of three 
popular theories. I am doing this to better understand how communities are, or 
are not, connected with institutions through secularly framed discourses and un-
derstandings. The three theories of secularization addressed are the Religious Eco-
nomics Model, the Sociopolitical Conflict Model, and The Sociocultural Trans-
formation Model.  
The Religious Economics Model uses economic theory to explain the success 
of religion in certain environments and the decline of religion in other environ-
ments. The productivity of religion, according to this model, is dependent upon 
competition in the form of other traditions or religious groups.35 When individu-
als have many options regarding religion (firms) they act like competitive shoppers 
out to find the best religious “product” that they can. If this is reversed and there 
is little competition then the religious culture becomes “lethargic” and there are 
low levels of “religious consumption.”36 This model will be important later in this 
chapter because it is an approach that Americans use to imagine Iraqi religion.  
The Religious Economic Model deemphasizes the role of politics in religion. 
This is significant because with the American focus on Islamism (political Islam), 
religion and politics are understood as being intertwined in Iraq. For someone 
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understanding the conflict in Iraq within this economic lens, the political aspects 
of the conflict would be ignored as seems to be the case by Americans in the early 
stages of the Occupation of Iraq. Such a mindset by the American-led occupation-
al force allowed for the quick disintegration of Iraq’s middle class, which this the-
sis will address in chapter 3.  
The Sociopolitical Conflict Model uses sociopolitical conflict as a key factor in 
determining the success or decline of religion. According to this model, when a 
religious institution is very dependent upon the state and the ruling class then op-
position to the regime will result in an anti-religious feeling as the religious insti-
tution “and the state will tend to become closely identified with one another.”37 As 
we will also see in chapter 3, it is through this model that the framework of Iraqi 
violence will be understood directly after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
2003. It is my contention that the Ba’athist Party and Iraq’s Sunni Muslims were 
explicitly linked together by the disenfranchised Shi’a majority.  
The Sociocultural Transformation model of secularization works to address 
the root of sociopolitical conflict itself through the growth of secular ideologies. 
Gorski uses Durkheim’s idea of division of labor to argue that up until recent 
times “intellectual labor in Western societies had been monopolized by the priestly 
class.”38 After the Renaissance, the intellectual world grew to include many 
di erent types of people from di erent professions, and inevitably the language 
used became increasingly secular as did “non religious sources of moral valua-
tion.”39 This resulted in many people considering worldviews and philosophies 
that were essentially non-religious: Gorski cites nationalism and socialism as two 
such examples.  
This model is helpful in that it allows us to better understand how America 
sees Islam in contention with the modern world since Islamism is bitterly opposed 
to nationalism. Because many Americans understand Islamism to be Islam proper, 
it is easy to understand how they would interpret al-Qaeda’s rejection of national-
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ism as Islam’s rejection of secularization and therefore Islam’s rejection of moderni-
ty.  
As has been explained, Western perceptions of Islam and Arab culture have 
been influenced by Orientalism and are seen as laden with radical, revolutionary, 
and anti-American overtones, particularly when the media refer to fundamental-
ism, Islamic terror, and jihad. This bias manifests itself in news, literature, film, 
and other forms of popular culture. Michael Hunt argues that Anglo-Saxon rac-
ism and Social Darwinism have become fused in the American mind. In other 
words, Americans believe the civilized powers-the United States and Western Eu-
rope-are somehow in control of or responsible for, lesser races in a descending so-
cial ladder of underdeveloped and even primitive cultures.40  
1.6 Jihad vs. McWorld 
Islam’s imagined conflict with the rest of the world is often framed with the term 
jihad (holy war). The origin of the term jihad and how it has acquired the mean-
ing used in this paper will be covered in depth in chapter 2. In this chapter, how-
ever, I will be focusing on the term’s dissemination in American media and Ameri-
ca’s cultural understanding of the term in contemporary conflict. One of the best 
examples and one of the most influential works on America’s vision of jihad is 
Benjamin Barber’s book Jihad vs. McWorld (2001). Originally printed in 1995 and 
re-released after the September 11 attacks, Barber’s book introduced countless 
Americans to militant Muslims partially in an attempt to answer the perennial 
question of “why do they hate us?” Barber portrays Islamic “fundamentalism” as a 
quintessential example of the defensive reaction against secularism, modernity, 
and cosmopolitanism that has surfaced in other regions and cultures.41 Barber 
constructs a vision of an epic struggle between the forces of Islam (jihad) and 
modern secular society (McWorld). The book o ers a compelling, overarching 
paradigm for globalization and its discontents. It shows Islamist groups united in 
their opposition to the global spread of Western culture. These united groups are 
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most often characterized by American policymakers and members of the media as 
being represented by or as a part of the al-Qaeda network.  
Barber characterizes McWorld as a secular place where “corporations are more 
central players in global a airs than nations.”42 McDonalds is the epitome of such 
corporations for Barber, hence the name he has given to McWorld. He goes on to 
construct McWorld’s citizens as “not citizens of any particular nation or members 
of a parochial clan” but instead belonging to “the universal tribe of consumers 
defined by needs and wants.”43 These citizens exist in a globalized market culture 
which is based on the religious economics model reviewed earlier. Barber uses this 
model to conclude that McWorld “lacks anything resembling a civic envelope. As 
a result it cannot support the values and institutions associated with religion.”44  
Barber homogenizes all Middle Eastern violent actors, understood through 
Orientalism to be fundamentalist Muslims, as “people who detest modernity—the 
secular, scientific, rational, and commercial civilization created by the Enlighten-
ment.”45 He decides that “these enemies of the modern” seek “to recover the dead 
past by annihilating the living present.”46 Here, Barber equates modernity with 
Western cultural dominance. It is important to understand that many Islamists do 
not reject modernism so much as they seek to reconstruct it on Islamic founda-
tions. According to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, new Islamic political discourse 
“has facilitated the shift of at least some Arab Islamists toward a constructive en-
gagement with the emerging networks of global civil society.”47 Barber’s work is 
therefore not helpful in depicting a nuanced and accurate picture of violent Mid-
dle Eastern actors but it is an excellent example of how such actors are homoge-
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nized in American discourse. As a regular writer for news periodicals such as Har-
per’s, the Atlantic Monthly, and many other publications, Barber is but one 
tor of the perception that militant Muslims are in a struggle with the rest of the 
“secular” world. This argument is not simply made by the media, however. It is 
arguable that the most powerful American generator of this world view is the 
American government.  
The U.S. State Department has e ectively combined all of the various mili-
tant groups in Iraq under an al-Qaeda umbrella in the minds of many American 
people. The State Department reports that al-Qaeda’s current goal is  
to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout 
the world by working with allied Islamic extremist 
groups to overthrow regimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’ 
and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims [and 
their influence] from Muslim countries—
particularly Iraq.48  
The current Bush administration had tried to draw a direct link between al-Qaeda 
and Iraq a full year before the 2003 invasion. On September 25, 2002, President 
Bush claimed that Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda worked “in concert,” and the 
following day, he claimed that Iraq had “long standing and continuing ties to ter-
rorist organizations” mainly al-Qaeda.  
American national security strategists and policymakers often frame this per-
ceived global conflict in specifically Islamic religious and moral terms because they 
believe such context motivates “Muslim” militants and inspires suicide bombers. 
However, it is unclear if these government o icials understand such terms. For 
instance, suicide bombings are described as irrational. This argument is being faci-
litated by the discourse of psychologists. Psychologist Clark McCauley describes 
such motivation as “a drive to feel a connection with God and the work of God, 
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to feel the peace of submission of God’s will.”49 McCauley gives a psychological 
assessment of those engaged in jihad as believing that “[f ]ear is an act of worship 
due only to God.”50 McCauley’s theory is supported by an argument posed by 
psychologist Roxanne Euben who argues against a “rational actor” theory of Mus-
lim terrorism. Euben contends that for the Islamic militant “there is no separation 
between religion and politics in Islam.” Therefore, she contends that these “fun-
damentalists” are operating under the belief that they are in fact engaged in a bat-
tle for “good versus evil” as described by McCauley. As a result, Euben says it is 
the fundamentalist belief that those that operate outside of the Islamic Law (the 
Qur’an) can only be cured of such ignorance through divine authority; or the em-
ployment of a holy war (jihad).51 In her work, Euben equates the Qur’an with the 
Shari’a in the constructing of Islamic law. She does not grasp the complex roles 
that each play in Islamic traditions. Such misunderstandings as to the sophistica-
tion of Islam allow her to reduce the religion to an ideologically violent version 
which al-Qaeda presents to the world.  
Yet al-Qaeda does not speak for all Muslims nor does it speak for all of the 
supposed religiously motivated militants who are causing violence in Iraq. The 
media have begun to di erentiate and nuance Iraqi violence, particularly in the 
light of sectarianism. It is arguable that sectarianism is one of the key construc-
tions through which Americans perceive violence in Iraq today.  
1.7 Constructing the Enemy through Threat Inflation 
The Associated Press noted in April 2002 that FOX News first began using the 
term "homicide bombings" in its own reports immediately after Bush administra-
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tion o icials adopted the term -- such as then-White House press secretary Ari 
Fleischer.52 While other news organizations continued to use the term "suicide 
bomber," the AP reported, "Dennis Murray, executive producer of [FOX News'] 
daytime programming, said executives there had heard the phrase ["homicide 
bombing"] being used by administration o icials in recent days and thought it 
was a good idea."53 FOX has applied the "homicide" terminology not only in its 
own original reports, but also in the AP reports that it publishes on its website. 
Readers are led to believe that the AP itself uses the "homicide" terminology, 
when in fact it does not. According to a Media Matters search, the AP has used the 
terms "homicide bomber" or "homicide bombing" when referring to terrorist at-
tacks in only one article, published on May 7, 2004. These terms have otherwise 
appeared in AP articles only in quotations via FOX News.  
As has been explained, media sources reporting on violence in Iraq are diverse. 
As is evident by FOX News, platforms for politically based misunderstandings of 
Iraqi culture and actions are available to the American masses. These media outlets 
have e ectively segmented recipients of news by political ideology. This allows 
individuals to discount news and information coming from outside their ideologi-
cal scope. It should therefore come as no surprise that press reports from “liberal” 
outlets which have questioned the presentation of violent Iraqi actors have had 
little impact on public opinion. Conservative media have in fact insulated occupa-
tion supporters from these reports. One study has reported that viewers of FOX 
News would not only be more likely to hold factually incorrect beliefs about the 
Iraq War after the war’s conclusion, but actually had become less informed the 
more they watched.54 
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By using the term homicide in the place of suicide, di erent cultures within 
the American media establishment can construct the “Muslim” suicide bomber as 
a vicious killer. Such presentations can reinforce the resolve that many Americans 
hold that America needs to continue its occupation of Iraq. This determination 
revolves around the Orientalist worldview already inspected in this thesis which 
labels Middle Easterners as savages in need of control by Western powers. It 
should be noted that the American media are in many ways just reflecting the 
terminology used by the current executive administration.  
Language such as “homicide bomber” and “suicide bomber” in American dis-
course on the iconic symbol of the suicide bomber is important because as Talal 
Asad asks, is there a crucial di erence between someone who kills in order to die 
and someone who dies in order to kill?55 Asad suggests that the open-endedness of 
motive in suicide bombings inevitably leaves considerable scope for interpreta-
tion.56 He therefore posits that suicide attacks are above all histories.57 In recount-
ing plausible histories, Asad reminds us that people employ fiction in their dis-
course. This helps us as scholars to understand why misrepresentations of religion 
arise in cases of conflict such as the suicide bombings. A mythology of suicide or 
homicide as pathology encourages fantasies which allow for accessibility to under-
standing actions like suicide bombings.58 Such mythology also allows for political-
ly influenced rhetoric to be disseminated. For example, the rhetoric of bringing 
democracy to the Middle East is thinly masking an argument for Western manag-
ing of the Middle East.  
Rhetoric emphasizing the need for Western policing of Iraq and its Middle 
Eastern neighbors is in line with American foreign policy today. One of the most 
critical aspects of American foreign policy for the 21st century is the emphasis on a 
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shift to internationalism. This is because within policymaking bureaucracies there 
is a “fading distinction between foreign and domestic policy bureaucracies.”59 
With the emphasis on internationalism, the United States has evolved with dis-
tinct new fundamentals. These include the goal to retain the country’s position as 
the number 1 superpower, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, the promotion 
of liberal democracies as a means of peace, the support of democratic allies, and a 
policy of pre-emptive self defense.60 Along with these new policies has come a shift 
in attitude among the policymakers. These policymakers see it as America’s “duty 
to make the world better for its inhabitants and to shape the ‘new world order’ so 
that the gains from the Cold War can be preserved.”61 In other words, American 
foreign policymakers have embraced a “constructivist and activist U.S. role in 
world politics.”62  
1.8 American Misunderstandings  
The fact that there has been an increase in American knowledge and understand-
ing with regard to Islam and actions within the Middle East during the last few 
years is undeniable. The expanding public awareness of Islam in both negative and 
positive senses more than ever signifies the importance of the media’s impact on 
the way people construct images of communities that are strange to them. Media 
exposure is not the only way Americans are expose to Islam; however, it is argua-
bly the most severe way. The media are a powerful agent for change. Many indi-
viduals and groups vie for their control. Therefore, the media are not insulated 
from politics. Is it then possible that the media have covered issues pertaining to 
Iraq, Islam, and violence in an objective manner? The fact that America is the 
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dominant state in today’s international system has meant that American percep-
tions of Islam, often informed by Orientalist assumptions, are influential 
throughout the world. Furthermore, it has meant that divergent views on Islam 
have been ignored.  
President George W. Bush has said “[b]y sacrificing life to serve their radical 
visions… (Islamists) follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarian-
ism.”63 Anchorage Daily News columnist and radio show host Dan Fagan has 
echoed the President by frequently using the term Islamo-fascism and he may 
have been one of the first to do so.64 He uses it casually in reference to the entire 
religion of Islam. The mixing of fascism and Islamism is problematic because, as 
will be explained in the next chapter, Islamist groups like al-Qaeda scorn the idea 
of nation-states. This part of their ideology contradicts fascism, which by 
definition is ultranationalist. Therefore the term Islamo-fascists propagates misin-
formation. Correcting media misinformation and bias should not be seen simply 
in terms of correcting facts. What allows the news about Islam to be conveyed and 
consumed in a particular way has to do with the predominance of Orientalist 
thinking in American culture.  
Due to the short nature of news reports, it is understandable how Americans 
draw connections between Islam and suicide bombers, fascism, and a host of other 
alarming things. A balanced portrayal of modern Islam is di icult to find in main-
stream Western media sources. If it were presented, it is likely that audiences 
would reject what they were exposed to because of their preconceived notions of 
foreign Islamic cultures. Edward Said argues that Middle Eastern spaces and actors 
such as those depicted in Iraq are co-created by the Western media and its au-
dience’s prejudices as much as these spaces and actors are created by their reality.65 
Said makes the argument that because Westerners have little contact with Islam, 
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they tend to orientalize and create simplified and flawed understandings of its tra-
ditions which are more stylized or stereotyped than they ought to be.66 For our 
purpose, this means the contexts for events in Iraq have to be recognized by the 
media’s audience. In telling a story, Said argues, the media must relate events in a 
way that allows American audiences to understand them in terms of their own 
society.  
While the media, en masse, are not solely responsible for the inaccurate image 
of suicide bombers and Islam, changes need to be made. Print media have led the 
way. They have shown an ability to adapt to burgeoning media such as blogging, 
which is responding to public demand for global awareness and accuracy. Howev-
er, TV media have not adapted. The primary purpose of TV media is not their 
providing of information but their selling of corporate advertisements. Television 
media are therefore a corporate tool. Accuracy is not their objective. Consequent-
ly, there is opportunity for inaccurate depictions of Iraqi suicide bombers to in-
crease on television. Inaccurate depictions as to the role of religion in suicide 
bombings are by no means limited to the government and media. Academia has 
also put forth inaccurate depictions of suicide bombers. The majority of writing 
and punditry about suicide bombers have been by political scientists and public 
policy experts. There has been a gap in religious studies scholarship. This is prob-
lematic because scholars of religion more than any other discipline can dispel the 
inaccuracies of religion’s role in suicide bombings depicted in American discourse.  
The scholar of religion Ivan Strenski has attempted to fill the gap that exists in 
religious studies scholarship on suicide bombers. Strenski argues that Muslim dis-
course on suicide bombers is multivalent.67 He adds that Western scholars have 
dwelled on the discourse of jihad to explain and understand suicide bombings. He 
says that the language of “gift” and “sacrifice” is also present and has explanatory 
                                                 
66  Ibid, 37 
67  Strenski, Ivan. "Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of Muslim ‘Human 
Bombers,’" Terrorism and Political Violence; Autumn 2003, Vol. 15 Issue 3, 
p1-34.  
 22
power in social sciences.68 For Strenski, religion is too important and too compel-
ling in significance to be the sole interpretive property of academics.69 He is cor-
rect. Religion being presented as the only cause of suicide bombings distorts the 
motivations of suicide actors. If analysts, policymakers, and academics are going to 
better understand the motivations of suicide bombers, they must have accurate 
information as to who becomes a suicide bomber.  
1.9 Beyond An Orientalist Discourse  
Who becomes a suicide bomber? The answer to this question is elusive. Some sug-
gest there are definite trends, others dispute that conclusion, and still others main-
tain that a profile cannot be developed as it is “unlikely that the search would be 
successful in creating a set of common denominators that could span several con-
tinents, time periods, cultures, and political configurations.”70 Although the data 
are limited, suicide bombers have one characteristic which typifies all—they are 
young. The average age varies from 21.5 (Turkey) to 23 (Lebanon), a small 
di erential. According to US military spokesman Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, 
the average suicide bomber in Iraq is a single male aged 22 years-old.71 Other cha-
racteristics do not hold. Some are widowers or widows and others have never been 
married; some are unemployed and others are professionals; some are poor and 
others are middle class. Most analysts can easily compare the female suicide 
bombers know as the Black Widows in Russia with Palestinian suicide bombers of 
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any gender, since both appear to be serving “struggles of national identity”72 with a 
possible religious, social, or nationalist element. As far as gender goes, researchers 
believe there are “few di erences between a man and a woman carrying out such a 
mission. It may be a surprise, but motivations are the same: they do believe, they 
are committed, they are patriotic, and this is combined with a cultural duty.”73 
Furthermore, they are young. Analysts note “positive attitudes toward political 
violence—already well entrenched in persons under 17 years of age (14.5 per-
cent)—actually increase in the population up to the age of 24 (14.9 percent) and 
decreases thereafter (6 percent at 64 years of age).”74  
Some fundamentalist clerics have expressed theological dilemmas in sanction-
ing suicide bombing, as Islam explicitly forbids suicide (intihar). The Qur’an 
states: “And do not kill yourselves, Allah is indeed merciful to you.” (Qur’an 4: 
29)75 Others note that the Prophet Mohammed explicitly forbade suicide and de-
creed, “He who drinks poison and kills himself will carry his poison in his hand 
and drink it in Hell for ever and ever.”76 However, while God punishes someone 
who commits suicide, he rewards the martyr. How the ulema construct ideology 
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and understanding does play a role in portions of suicide bombings. A more com-




Rethinking the Past: How Militant Ulema 
Constructed Islamist Ideology 
Once again, this paper asserts suicide bombing is not a solely religious phenome-
non. Religion is an element in the propagation of the phenomenon; however, reli-
gion is neither essential nor su icient for explanation of such actions. This being 
the case, it is important to explain the role that Islam can play in Iraqi suicide at-
tacks. Religion’s role through Islam as an element in such attacks has captured the 
public’s imagination and therefore requires clarification.  
2.1 Key Terms  
To begin this chapter, it is important to define key terms—namely ulema and Is-
lamism. The term ulema is a plural form used to refer to Muslim scholars who are 
o icially recognized as qualified to engage in Islamic studies.77 The distinction 
that ulema enjoy is that they are scholars in learned Islam through special training 
in religious schools and universities which is separate from the notion of popular 
Islam where people participate in cultural or folk practices.78 The ulema are noto-
rious for attempting to control the public debate over the central values of society. 
In the past, ulema “became tantamount to state o icials, helping governments by 
issuing fatwas (religious rulings) and publicly endorsing state policies.”79 However, 
the authority of the modern ulema has been weakened “by having to share their 
role as arbiters with secular intellectuals.”80  
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Islamism is Islam narrowed down to an ideology but it is undeniably a form of 
Islam and therefore an authentic religious tradition. Islamists see power as indivis-
ible. In the Middle East, Islamists imitate their enemies, the existing regimes. 
They make no distinction between long term and short term goals. Such non-
distinction may be accountable because of the internal conflicts that arise once 
they receive power. Security services that watch the day-to-day activities of these 
Islamist groups have sophisticated training but are not trained in the study of reli-
gion. The outlook of a scholar of religion is needed to understand what Islamism 
is really about. The role of the ulema is what visibly separates Islam and the vari-
ous forms of Islamism. In a fundamentalist state, the government takes measures 
so as not to be criticized by the ulema whereas in the Muslim world such criticism 
is common place. Mainstream Muslims and Islamists have little or no di erence of 
opinion over basic Islamic belief and its content or over the proper forms of wor-
ship and devotion. Islamism, as it has been manifested by the architects we are 
about to investigate, is new if only because it is concerned with the modern state. 
In the Middle East, it cannot be assumed that social change can be brought about 
without the application of force or violence. Many Islamist activists believe that 
the West has forced the Muslim community to abandon the Shari’ a and that the 
West now fears the Islamist movements. Islamists and conservative Muslims alike 
are convinced that the West is afraid of what will happen to the world when the 
Shari’a is again implemented. Indeed, Shari’a law has vast implications for what it 
could mean to human rights, economics, and travel to name a few. More practi-
cally, Shari’ a law is important because knowledge of it can give militants the 
confidence that the use of violence is just. It can also give them the terminology 
needed to appeal to particular cherished communities. This chapter will consider 
such Islamic militants who have had important influence on the development of 
Islamism. Doing so will provide a historical analysis for the construction of many 
of the Muslim concepts in American discourse reviewed last chapter. Such an in-
vestigation will allow this thesis to historicize, contextualize, and problematize 
rhetoric surrounding suicide attacks.  
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2.2 Ibn Taymiyya  
Some consider the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328) as the original 
architect of Islamism. Ibn Taymiyya was an influential Islamic thinker who, 
though he died in the early fourteenth century, laid intellectual foundations that 
are used in Islamism today.81 Ibn Taymiyya was a pragmatic thinker who ap-
proached the political world in a realpolitik fashion.82 A brief examination of his 
life helps to understand the development of his ideas.  
At the age of five years-old, Ibn Taymiyya became a refugee. His family fled 
their native Iraq for Syria in order to escape the Mongols. It is within a political 
and cultural climate sensitive to the Mongol threat that Ibn Taymiyya grew to 
adulthood. This is a central factor for understanding his later religious and politi-
cal ideology. It was in 1300 that the Mongols finally invaded Syria.83 The reigning 
Mongol Ilkhan, Ghazan, converted to Islam in 1295 and as such could frame 
himself as a legitimate Muslim ruler. Doing so allowed Ghazan to exploit the pro-
hibition in Islam against internecine Muslim fighting. Ibn Taymiyya did not ac-
cept the Mongol invasion as legitimate, however, and he set to work in developing 
and proliferating anti-Mongol propaganda. Taymiyya argued that Ghazan was 
Muslim only in appearance and that his policies proved that he remained loyal to 
Mongol beliefs and traditions. By failing to enforce Islamic law in his realm, Gha-
zan revealed that his Islamic conversion was fake. It was on this argument that Ibn 
Taymiyya pronounced Ghazan an apostate. Ibn Taymiyya built a case based on 
apostasy (abandoning the true faith) that Muslims could legitimately ignore Gha-
zan’s laws and enact total war on the un-Islamic Mongols.  
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It was through his work on the Mongols that Ibn Taymiyya established a 
boundary between true Islamic society and its non-Muslim enemies.84 To Tay-
miyya, these enemies posed a threat not just to Syrian Muslims but to the religion 
of Islam itself. The scope of the threat meant that war against the Mongols was the 
foremost priority of the community. This argument would be largely forgotten 
until the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb applied it to the modern world. This will 
be dealt with later in this paper.  
Ibn Taymiyya called for a literalist interpretation of the sacred sources (the 
Qur’an and Sunnah) for what he saw as a crucially needed Islamic renewal and 
reform of his society.85 These sources were his benchmark for orthodoxy. Like his 
ideological successors, he regarded the original community at Medina as the mod-
el for an Islamic state. Ibn Taymiyya sought the purification of Islam.86 This 
purification would entail a return to the purity of the period when Muhammad 
and the first four Caliphs ruled, because Ibn Taymiyya  believed that doing so was 
required for the Islamic community to gain its past glory and power. He also dis-
tinguished sharply between Islam and non-Islam (dar al-Islam and dar al-harb) the 
lands of belief and non-belief.87 Dar al-harb can also be interpreted literally as war. 
Ibn Taymiyya is also important because he made a harsh distinction between reli-
gion and culture. Although a Sufi, he denounced as superstition the popular prac-
tices of his day such as veneration of shrines and tombs as well as saint worship. 
The act of denouncing popular practices within Islam would become a model for 
future Islamists to control populations and groups. The authority to say what is 
and what is not proper Islamic belief and practice can give Islamic extremists 
agency over community behaviors. Such a tactic would be developed further by 
Hasan al-Banna and other members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
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2.3 The Muslim Brotherhood  
The Muslim Brotherhood called for an Islamic form of the modern nation state 
and it may have been the first organization to do so. When the Muslim Brother-
hood was founded in Egypt during the 1920s, the Muslim world was in turmoil. 
The Ottoman o ice of the Caliphate had been eliminated and replaced with a 
secular Turkish national republic. The Caliphate had long stood as a symbol for 
Muslim unity. At the same time that the Ummah was crumbling, the land of Is-
lam was being divided up by Christian powers. Hasan al-Banna created the Mus-
lim Brotherhood in Egypt in order to reclaim Islam’s political dimension which he 
believed had been lost with the Caliphate. For al-Banna and his Brotherhood, Is-
lam was as complete an ideological system as was possible on earth. They saw no 
need for European values to be included as a basis for social order. The Qur’an 
was the only moral authority. Its values were universal. This belief is the founda-
tion of the whole Islamist movement and was al-Banna’s greatest contribution to 
this construction. Whatever their other beliefs, all Islamists believe that the answer 
to fixing the Muslim world relies on the setting up of an Islamic state that will 
apply the law of Islam, the Shari’ a, as the rule of law just as the earliest Caliphs 
had achieved in the past. Intellectual as well as physical battle lines were drawn 
between the Brothers and the Egyptian government. The government cracked 
down on the Islamists who wished to overthrow it. Therefore, the process of Isla-
mization of the modern nation-state appears to have been started by Hasan al-
Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood. A number of revolutionary groups that have 
subsided into primitive rebellion have been seen as a continuation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
Al-Banna called for a return to an original Islam and chronologically but not 
ideologically followed Islamic reformers like Muhammad Abduh. According to al-
Banna, contemporary Islam had lost its social dominance, because most Muslims 
had been corrupted by Western influences.88 The Brotherhood has been an illegal 
organization, tolerated to varying degrees, since 1954 when it was convicted of 
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attempting to assassinate Gamal Abdel Nasser, head of the Egyptian government. 
The Brotherhood denied involvement in an assassination conspiracy and accused 
the Egyptian government of fraud as a basis to persecute the group and its 
members. From 1954 until Nasser's death in 1971, thousands of Muslim 
Brotherhood members were systemically persecuted under Nasser's regime. 
Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, promised the Brotherhood that Shari'a would be 
implemented as the Egyptian law and released all of the Brotherhood prisoners. 
However, as a result of Sadat signing a peace agreement with Israel in 1979, an 
Islamist group other than the Brotherhood assassinated Sadat in September, 1981 
based on a fatwa approved by Omar Abdel-Rahman.  
The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest mass and now worldwide Islamist 
movement. Because of its long history, it has had a substantial impact on almost 
all other Islamist organizations in a variety of ways. Many have been inspired by it. 
Some, like Saudi Wahhabism, have collaborated with it and been profoundly 
influenced by that association. Others have grown out of it, led by defectors who 
ultimately rejected its approach and set a new and frequently violent course of 
their own. This includes al-Qaeda, the Brotherhood being one of bin Laden’s first 
intellectual influences.   
2.4 Inspiration From Abdul Ala Mawdudi and Ruhollah Khomeini  
As Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood were persecuted in Egypt, Abul Ala 
Mawdudi was in Pakistan opposing the Muslim nationalism that had given birth 
to the state of Pakistan in 1947. Mawdudi wanted a state where power would be 
exercised in the name of Allah and the sharia and Qur’an would be the sole au-
thority. The nationalists wanted a Muslim state on the Indian subcontinent; how-
ever, Mawdudi wanted all of India to become Muslim to which the Pakistan na-
tionalists were opposed.89 To Mawdudi, nationalism was immoral because its 
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notion of a state was European-inspired. He said that politics were “an integral, 
inseparable part of the Islamic faith, and that the Islamic state that Muslim politi-
cal action seeks to build is a panacea for all their problems.”90 It was therefore 
through Mawdudi that Islam was turned from a religious tradition into an ideolo-
gy for political struggle. However, it is interesting to note that Mawdudi fought 
his holy war by using the political system of Pakistan to his advantage rather than 
taking a radical stance of opposition to the political system itself. He formed the 
Jamaat-i-Islami as a political party which has existed legally for the majority of its 
history. The party’s social base has mostly been the Middle Class and the party has 
yet to appeal to the poor in Pakistan. The party has even been called an “ideolo-
gyical fraternity.”91 This is in part because the poorer classes in Pakistan do not 
read or speak Urdu which is the language used by Jamaat-i-Islami.  
An excellent example of Mawdudi’s radical ideas can be found in his work, 
entitled Four Technical Terms of the Qur’an. Mawdudi writes that the gradual lin-
guistic drift in the Arabic language had caused Muslims to move away from the 
true teachings of the Qur’an and the pious predecessors (al-salaf al-saleh).92 This 
idea was picked up by other Islamists right through to Osama bin Laden and 
therefore various members of his Al Qaeda network including Al Qaeda in Iraq.  
Ruhollah Khomeini brought about a Shiite intellectual revolution in Iran. 
Khomeini was the first leading Shiite cleric to endorse Islamist ideas. Up until 
Khomeini, Islamism was a Sunni construction. But Khomeini joined the Sunnis 
in preaching for the destruction of the institutional order. Being a cleric, Khomei-
ni was able to galvanize supporters more e ectively than the intellectual elites like 
al-Banna and Mawdudi who had gone before him. This is a key reason why the 
Shiite Islamic Revolution has had no equal in the Sunni world. An important con-
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tribution of Khomeini to the Islamist construction was his ability to unite the 
classes and make Islamism appealing to everyone. However, Khomeini accepted 
the existence of the modern nation-state as legal despite his anti-Western rhetoric. 
His use of the word republic when referring to Iran betrays this fact.  
2.5 Sayyid Qutb  
Sayyid Qutb borrowed from these various other architects and, as has been men-
tioned earlier, added his own definitions and interpretations to this construction 
of Islamism93. Qutb espoused both al-Banna and Mawdudi’s notion of an Islamic 
state but broke with his notion of slowly transforming the state through political 
action. Instead, Qutb sought to create a revolution as a means to seize power 
much like Khomeini. For Qutb, it was the Islamist’s duty to break immediately 
with a nationalist state and to seek its destruction.94 In this way, Qutb saw Islam 
as an instrument for what he considered to be social justice. This is where Qutb 
reinvigorated a concept known as Jahiliyyah which he got from Mawdudi. Qutb 
called for a new Qur’anic generation to build a contemporary Islamic community 
on the ruins of Arab nationalism just as the Prophet and his generation had built 
the Muslim community on the ruins of Arab paganism. For Qutb, nationalism 
was Jahiliyyah just as much as being a non-Muslim. In some cases he combined 
the two by stating that nationalists were themselves takfir, or impure Muslims.95 
Literally, takfir means “calling someone a nonbeliever.”96 
In the late 1940s, Qutb visited the United States. This came to be a turning 
point in his life. His trip transformed Qutb from being an admirer of the West 
into being one of its most severe critics. His experiences in America created a cul-
ture shock which made him more religious and convinced him of the moral deca-
dence of the West. He was appalled by America’s materialism, promiscuity, and 
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alcohol consumption. Perhaps most importantly, Qutb was sickened by America’s 
racism which he directly experienced because of his dark skin. His views on Amer-
ica are summed up in his influential book Milestones where he writes: 
Look at this capitalism with its monopolies, its 
usury… this individual freedom, devoid of human 
sympathy and responsibility for relatives except 
under force of law; this materialistic attitude which 
deadens the spirit; this behavior, like animals, 
which you call “emancipation of women”… this 
evil and fanatic discrimination.97 
Qutb regarded the West as the historic enemy of Islam demonstrated by the 
crusades, European colonialism, and the Cold War.98 The Western threat was reli-
gious, cultural, and political. Equally dreadful were Muslim state actors who go-
verned according to Western values such as secularism which Qutb saw as threat-
ening Islamic faith.99 Qutb denounced all governments and Western secular-
oriented elites. 
Qutb translated the logic of Ibn Taymiyya’s rulings on apostasy into a com-
prehensive perspective on the troubles of Islam in the modern world.100 Qutb 
called on Muslims to make war on the ruling elites of both the Middle East and 
the greater planet. As Qutb saw it, a global evil threatened to annihilate Islam. 
Without an Islamic revolution, Islam would perish. “Mankind today,” Qutb 
writes as the opening words of his book Milestones, “is on the brink of a preci-
pice.”101 Such thinking allowed Qutb and his ideological successors to divide the 
world into absolute categories of good and evil. Within these constructed catego-
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ries, groups can and do use violence as a way of cultural, political, and religious 
cleansing.  
Al-Qaeda has been an ideological successor of Qutb. According to al-Qaeda, 
violence will avert Qutb’s foreseen disaster and usher in a new Islamic world of 
prosperity.102 This is important in respect to the proliferation of suicide bombers 
in Iraq. Al-Qaeda is framing the United States as neo-Mongols whose authority is 
empowering an apostate government in Iraq. According to Al-Qaeda, under false 
rulers, Muslims su er harm, oppression, and torture.103 Therefore, suicide bomb-
ings can be presented as legitimate martyrdom operations and as acts of self de-
fense. A 2004 survey of Iraqi citizens established that, outside of the Kurdish 
North, 81% of Iraqis considered coalition troops to be occupiers and not libera-
tors.104  
2.6 The Godfather of Jihad  
An important figure to look at in the spreading of Islamism is Abdallah Azzam 
(1941-1989). Azzam was a central figure in the global development of the militant 
Islamist movement.105 Azzam was a teacher of Osama bin Laden’s so it is of no 
great surprise that Al Qaeda in Iraq would use his concepts in their terrorism rhe-
toric.106 Azzam was “the leading contemporary mouthpiece of the jihad, popula-
rizing the concept of armed struggle that would be developed further in the 1990s 
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by much more radical activists.”107 In his work, entitled Defense of the Muslim 
Lands: the First Obligation after Iman, Azzam writes: 
One of the most important lost obligations is the 
forgotten obligation of fighting. Because it is ab-
sent from the present condition of the Muslims, 
they have become as rubbish of the flood waters. 
Just as the Prophet (saw) said: "It is expected that 
the nations will call each other from all horizons, 
as diners calling each other to feast from a platter 
of food in front of them." A person asked the 
Prophet (saw) would that be because of our small 
number that day. The Prophet (saw) said, "No, but 
you will be rubbish like the rubbish of flood water. 
Allah will put Wahn into your hearts and remove 
the fear from the hearts of your enemies because of 
your love for the world and your hate of death". In 
another narration it was said: "and what is the 
Wahn, O messenger of Allah?" He (saw) said: "love 
of the world and the hate for fighting." Narrated 
by Ahmad with a good chain. Narrated by Abu 
Daud with the words "hate for death", and it is a 
sahih hadith.108 
In this text, Azzam is equating Muslims who do not fight “infidels” with those 
who have a “selfish” attachment to materialism. He makes this judgment by proc-
laiming that the reasoning behind not taking arms must be a love of “this worldly” 
matters as opposed to “other worldly” matters such as Allah. Therefore, the Mus-
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lims in question are comparing their staying alive to God and are thus committing 
the worst crime possible, which is shirk, associating something as being equal to 
God.  
After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Azzam’s priority “was to dem-
onstrate that the jihad in Afghanistan was an obligation for all good Muslims.”109 
Azzam rose up against any man who called jihad “a collective obligation” (fard 
kifaya) to be left to the politicians.110 Instead, he insisted that jihad was an indi-
vidual obligation (fard ayn) that every Muslim should participate in. Azzam la-
beled the Soviets as kafir or ku ar meaning ungodly and impious.111 Azzam wrote:  
Defensive Jihad—this is expelling the Ku ar from 
our land, and it is Fard Ayn, a compulsory duty 
upon all. It is the most important of all the com-
pulsory duties and arises in the following condi-
tions: 1) If the Ku ar enter a land of the Muslims. 
2) If the rows meet in battle and they begin to ap-
proach each other. 3) If the Imam calls a person or 
a people to march forward then they must march. 
4) If the Ku ar capture and imprison a group of 
Muslims.112 
Here, Azzam demonstrates his interpretation of jihad. He presents an armed jihad 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan as an Islamic cause that concerned all Muslims 
around the world. By saying that an Imam has the final say over fighting instead 
of politicians, Azzam struck a blow to understandings of government authority.  
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Azzam is a prime example of an Islamist reinterpreting Ibn Taymiyyah to suit 
his cause. He writes:  
Sheikh Ibn Taymia says on this topic: “About the 
defensive jihad, which is repelling an aggressor, is 
the most tasking type of jihad. As agreed upon by 
everyone, it is obligatory to protect the religion 
and what is sacred. The first obligation after Iman 
is the repulsion of the enemy aggressor who as-
saults the religion and the worldly a airs.”113 
As has already been stated, the appropriation of Ibn Taymiyya has sought to 
legitimize various Islamist world views. In tracing the appropriation of Ibn Tay-
miyya, it is arguable that Azzam is one of the most important figures after Sayyid 
Qutb. Azzam has also used Ibn Taymiyya to a ect the acceptance of Muslim ca-
sualties during war. He has done this by writing: 
Ibn Taymia said in Majmua al Fatawa 28/537: "If 
with the Ku ar there are pious people from the 
best of mankind and it is not possible to fight these 
Ku ar except by killing them, then they are to be 
killed as well."114 
By writing this, Azzam created a line of thought that other militants have built 
upon that justifies Muslim casualties during suicide bombing attacks within to-
day’s U.S. occupied Iraq. This statement also illustrates the extent to which Mus-
lims rely heavily on the past for meaning and guidance in the present. It is very 
common for medieval and pre-modern theologians and movements to directly 
impact the world of Islam today. Azzam’s has further complicated the current 
situation within Iraq by writing:  
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If the Jihad becomes Fard Ayn it nullifies the peace 
treaty such as when the enemy enters the Muslim 
lands or intends harm upon them. Fath Aliy of 
Malik 1/289 on the subject of peace treaties in 
Mayir in the chapter Jihad: “The Caliph signs a 
peace treaty with Christians but the Muslims feel 
the only solution is Jihad, then his peace treaty is 
annulled and his deed rejected.”115 
By writing this, Azzam has constructed an argument that militants and suicide 
bombers use today in Iraq to justify the rejection of the coalition force working 
with Iraq’s government. These actors say that violent jihad is a noble course of ac-
tion and those who carry out suicide attacks are often proclaimed to be martyrs.  
The term ‘martyrdom’ has had an extraordinary transformation within Islam. 
The original use of the word in the Qur’an was “to bear witness.” Today’s more 
popular understanding of the term is to die a holy death. Martyrdom is Arabic is 
shahada. This is from the term shaheed or witness. Whenever dying for Allah is 
mentioned in the Qur’an, one encounters phrases such as “slain in the cause of 
God” (II: 154)116. ‘The cause of God’ (Sabil Allah) has become the major expres-
sion understood to designate martyrdom. The combination of these two under-
standings of “to bear witness” and “martyrdom” in shahada serves to construct vio-
lent militants as both an icon of a holy death as well as a witness to the 
authenticity of Islam. In the Shi’ite tradition, Ali is quoted as saying “He who dies 
in the path of God does not die, but rather is immortalized.”117 However, David 
Cook points out that the Prophet's life, which is taken as a template for all other 
Muslims to live by, did not end in martyrdom. Consequently, in contrast to 
Christianity for instance, martyrdom lies at the periphery of the Islamic tradition 
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and not at its centre.118 In other words, martyrdom is not a traditional act of vene-
ration associated with the Prophet Mohammad and is thus arguably not a chief 
component of practicing the tradition. This is substantiation for my argument 
that only extreme Islamist groups promote suicide bombings and Islam is not the 
foremost element in all suicide attacks.  
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Chapter 3 
Religious Persecution: An Iraq Survey 
The population of Iraq is diverse. Its total population is about 25 million people 
who are divided ethnically between Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkomen with 
smaller groups like the Shabak making up the rest.119 Islam is the religion of the 
majority and Arabic is universally spoken outside of Iraqi’s northern Kurdistan 
area. The Shi’a comprise 60% of the total population. The Kurds count for 20% 
and the Sunnis make up about 18%.120 Baghdad, which accounts for a quarter of 
the country’s population, is a majority Shi’a city. Yet it has a large population of 
the country’s Sunni. The upper areas of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are mostly 
Sunni enclaves. Northern Iraq is a mixture of peoples and religions. The city of 
Mosul has a majority Sunni population but it includes important Kurdish and 
Christian populations. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the majority of the population is Sunni 
Muslim. Southern Iraq is overwhelmingly populated by the Shi’a. However, the 
city of Basra has an important Sunni minority. As has just been demonstrated, 
Iraq is a diverse and dynamic country. This chapter will disaggregate the conflict 
in Iraq to better fracture the monolithic moniker that it has been characterized 
with in American media and discourse. This thesis cannot adequately address an 
accurate portrait of Iraq’s suicide bombers without first accurately addressing the 
contexts in which such actors are performing in.  
3.1 The State of Modern Iraq  
The modern country of Iraq emerged out of World War I. Iraq’s boundaries were 
drawn by Great Britain with little to no input from its residents.121 Iraq had been 
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carved out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Originally, it included two 
Ottoman provinces of Baghdad and Basra. Mosul was added in 1926.122 These 
three provinces form the expanse of the modern state of Iraq. Iraq acquiesced to 
British rule from 1920 to 1947. This was followed by a shorter period of de facto 
British power until the nationalist revolt of 1958. This experience of European 
imperialism is relevant to the discourses and rhetoric being produced in Iraq to-
day. For instance, many Iraqis see the U.S. mission of spreading democracy as a 
manifestation of neo-imperialism. This is because, even with the restoration of 
ostensible Iraqi sovereignty on June 28th 2004, the coalition force with its British 
allies is still very much in control of the country. Iraq’s prior history under British 
rule has all but guaranteed that current U.S./British rule would be deeply re-
sented.  
Bitter personal memories of British dominance have been preserved by the 
older generations of Iraqis. Therefore, many Iraqi citizens have been predisposed 
to defend their national sovereignty by opposing occupation by Western powers, 
especially an occupation conducted with the inclusion of the British. Also, past 
U.S. policies in the region have helped to fuel Iraqi anger and resentment. The 
most notable policy has been the United States’ close collaboration with Saddam 
Hussein against Iran in the 1980s. It was during this time period that some of his 
notorious human rights abuses were committed.123 Adding to this bitterness are 
new grievances that Iraqis have with the coalition force. Military actions which 
have been aggressive to fight insurgents have produced a high toll of civilian 
death, wounding, and su ering. The number of Iraqi civilian casualties is con-
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tested.124 The most scientifically conducted survey suggests that the total number 
of Iraqi death is higher than reported.125  
3.2 Human Rights Abuses  
Saddam Hussein was able to consolidate his power as leader of the Iraqi state due 
to his extensive control of the country’s internal security organization. He was able 
to e ectively eliminate most opposition before it could take shape. He was quoted 
as saying: 
I know there are scores of people plotting to kill 
me. I know they are conspiring to kill me long be-
fore they actually start planning to do so. This 
enables me to get them before they have the faint-
est chance of striking me.126 
This is a quote that Hussein lived by for the entirety of his dictatorship. He was 
able to transform the Ba’ath party into an extension of himself. He packed the 
party with people who were personally related to and loyal to him. Everything 
that the government did under Saddam Hussein was with the intention of ensur-
ing the retention of power by the leadership.  
The institutionalization of the Ba’athist party into Iraqi society was one of 
Hussein’s paramount goals. The party was concentrated on penetrating society at 
every level. The politics of Iraq were controlled in the following ways: by creating 
an extensive internal party organization and fostering its growth; by maintaining a 
paramilitary organization that was loyal to the party; by attempting to bring other 
political groups into the system where they could be controlled; and by creating a 
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National Assembly which gave promise to the public of a more representative lea-
dership.127 
As has been mentioned, it is the recent events following the US occupation of 
Iraq which occupy a central place in this investigation. It has been during this pe-
riod that suicide bombers have appeared in Iraq and it is within this context that 
Iraqis have been fighting a modern military in hopes of preventing what some of 
them see as colonial-like powers from taking control of Iraq. As Iraqi hard power 
and international prestige has diminished, sectarian sentiments128 have become a 
pervasive aspect within the Iraqi political and social spheres. As has been common 
in other Middle Eastern countries experiencing Islamic sectarian di erences, reli-
gious institutions became involved in the propagation of sectarian rhetoric. As a 
consequence, many citizens began to reinterpret the importance and function of 
their religious tradition so as to remain in step with growing sectarian sentiments.  
For our investigation, we have to think about ways in which religion, politics, 
and culture interact. The University of Chicago religious historian Bruce Lincoln 
has investigated the Muslim bombers of 9/11 in an e ort to analyze the textual 
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detritus that links religion to the motivations of the 9/11 bombers.129 However, 
Lincoln is not a specialist in Islamic Studies, but rather a comparativist and theor-
ist.  As Lincoln has noted, religion is culturally bound, historically recent, and dis-
cursively loaded.130 Religion is also historically specific. The extent to which reli-
gion penetrates and controls other aspects of culture becomes more evident in 
instances of cultural contact.131 The contact produced from the Western occupa-
tion of Iraq along with the cultural and political upheaval that the occupation has 
caused certainly constituted an atmosphere for religious change if we accept the 
premise that religion is culturally bound. Yet it is important to also remember that 
no definition of religious theory is universal and the same for all people in all 
places. Therefore, one can use Bruce Lincoln’s assessment that religion is culturally 
bound, historically recent, and discursively loaded to help map out the ways in 
which religion, politics, and culture interact in Iraq but we must be careful not to 
emphasize this argument as the preeminent and sole reason for growing sectarian 
di erences within the country.  
3.3 Defining Religious Persecution  
For the purposes of the empirical portion of this study, religious persecution is 
defined as constraints, destruction, injury, fear, and death placed on those of a 
particular religious tradition or organization, who are in a minority in an area, 
which are not placed on those in the majority. This definition implies prejudice 
and di erential treatment. Also, this definition does not include restrictions which 
are economic in nature. An attempt to define persecution will be revisited 
throughout this chapter.  
3.4 Thinking About National Identity  
There are two ways of thinking about national identity. The first is that all people 
who are citizens within a country’s borders are part of the nation regardless of 
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their racial, ethnic, or religious identity. This can be termed civic nationalism. The 
second is that nations are characterized by a shared heritage which can include a 
common culture, language, religious tradition, and ancestry. This can be termed 
ethnonationalism.132 It is through this second view that one can understand the 
complexities of religious persecution in Iraq. Ethnonationalism draws much of its 
power from the subjective belief in the reality of a common “we.” Communal 
boundaries therefore have significance. As Walker Connor has noted, “[i]t is not 
what is, but what people believe is that has behavior consequences.”133 When the 
markers that distinguish the in-group of a nation deteriorate, the national cohe-
siveness also deteriorates and with it the possibility for conflict increases. In Iraq’s 
case, the conflict has most often been characterized by Western media as being 
sectarian in nature.  
In regard to the suicide bomber, as with other non-state actors (NSA) partici-
pating in disruptive conduct and terrorism, the process of aligning him or herself 
with the understood growing trend of sectarianism has been exacerbated by the 
fact that American-led coalition troops made a concentrated e ort to suppress Im-
ams and other Islamic leaders engaged in anti-Western and anti-American rhetor-
ic.134 This religiously and politically backed rhetoric has been proclaimed by those 
hoping to further American strategic power as unauthentic Islam, and these indi-
viduals have sought to replace it with sanctioned pro-Western Islamic discourse. 
Coalition troops minimized access into and out of communities where groups 
who espoused anti-Western rhetoric wielded control.135 There can be no doubt 
that such a crackdown must have fueled some Iraqis to feel it necessary to prove 
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their Islamic and or Iraqi identity in juxtaposition to the largely Judeo-Christian 
forces who have sought to wield power over their community.  
3.5 The Disintegration of Iraq 
Our insights into the construction of Islamism and sectarianism help to explain 
the conflict that has erupted in Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003. The vari-
ous Sunni and Shiite Islamist groups who are often in opposition to one another 
are also openly in opposition to Iraqi nationalism. Once again, it is on the Islamist 
agenda to destroy nationalist ideology with the intention of substituting one vi-
sion of world community for another. Furthermore, it is safe to say that political 
disintegration and reformulation can lead to the demonization of people who 
were not demons before. This helps to explain the rapidity by which communities 
were degraded along sectarian lines. Five years after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq, scholars and military experts alike still continue to debate the rea-
sons why the United States so far has failed to quell the sectarian violence for 
postwar reconstruction in Iraq. The lack of adequate security has been identified 
as a central problem to postwar reconstruction. In its final report, the Iraq Study 
Group, headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman 
Lee Hamilton, called for significant troop reductions as a way of reconfiguring the 
Coalition presence and slowing Islamic resurgence.136  
The roaming of sectarian death squads in the Iraqi streets has led to the dete-
riorating of religious and ethnic divides. The demand for vengeance against for-
mer Ba’athist party members, who are seen as being responsible for the country’s 
24 year-long repression, has led to the killing of countless Sunnis in the past five 
years. These killings have been “more pronounced in areas in the South and Sadr 
City (which) su ered most from Ba’athist repression.”137 Such killings can be seen 
as a response by people seeking justice who have lost confidence in the U.S. and 
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its allies’ ability to bring said justice. The decision to bring Ba’athist party mem-
bers back into government no doubt served to reinforce this loss of confidence. It 
should safely be assumed that the fact that the U.S. has seemed concerned with 
only arresting the elite members of the former autocratic regime, known as the 
“pack of cards,” while leaving the implementers of the regime free, has spurred on 
this conflict. Religious leaders appear to sanction such killings. Work by the death 
squads, which were originally against those who could be clearly identified by past 
victims or by reputations, quickly escalated.  
The membership lists of the Ba’ath party and intel-
ligence operatives began to be widely circulated, 
following the seizure of document caches after the 
fall of Baghdad. Death squads started to work on 
these lists and, by June 2003, the killings began to 
include academics, teachers, bureaucrats, artists, 
journalists, and professionals who were seen as part 
of the regime’s control and repression apparatus.138 
Reaction to Shi’ite death squads resulted in the creation of Sunni death squads 
seeking retaliation. A new special police commando unit had been organized by a 
“Saddam-era” general named Adnan Thabit who was the uncle to Iraq’s Minister 
of the Interior.139 These Special Police Commandos, drawn from former Saddam-
era special forces and the Republican Guard, were supposed to feature importantly 
in various “counter-insurgency operations in late 2004 and early 2005, notably in 
the Samarra area.”140 However, these units did not end sectarian killings. Instead, 
the Ministry of Interior’s elite Special Police heralded the growth of a death squad 
culture under o icial sanction.  
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3.6 The Role of Privilege  
According to Max Weber, the state is the most pivotal sight of authority in the 
modern nation.141 He says that states are found in all modern societies with a 
complex division of labor.142 Weber defines a state as “a collection of interlocking 
institutions that claim a monopoly over the means of domination in a given terri-
tory.”143 The state partially justifies its domination because of its role as sole pro-
tector (agent) designated to protect its population from foreign aggressors. If there 
is not a real foreign threat to the nation, the state sometimes artificially manufac-
tures threats to justify its dominance over the national population.144 Internal law 
and order (courts, police, prisons) are also things that the state tries to monopol-
ize.145 
The Sunni led Ba’athist regime of pre-occupied Iraq had considered Iran’s 
influence in Iraq to be the most prevalent danger to the Iraqi state. The regime 
worried about the Sunni minority’s future in a country with a clear Shi’a majority 
which may or may not have held secret sectarian loyalties to Iran. These fears led 
to the state domination of the Shi’a people and to their brutal repression at the 
will of Saddam Hussein. Arguing that Iran posed an imminent threat to Iraqi se-
curity, the Ba’athist regime was able to construct a framework in which it could 
claim justification for its brutal treatment of dissent within the country. It was 
through this repressive state security mechanism that millions of Shi’a were put to 
death. I argue that it is the communal memories of the Shi’a, remembering how 
the Iraqi state used its role as protector to brutally dominate the largest contingent 
of its national population, which helped “sectarian” violence erupt within the na-
tion after the initial occupation by American led forces. Furthermore, I argue that 
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violent Sunni actors operating in Iraq today still use this argument for the propa-
gation of violence against Iraq’s Shi’a population. Pamphlets and martyrdom vid-
eos by Sunni identified Iraqi militants, including suicide bombers, openly discuss 
their fear that Iran will dominate a post-occupied Iraq and seek to restore a type of 
regional control that the Persian Empire had in the sixteenth century.146 It is this 
history of the state privileging of one social group over another that has inflamed 
tensions in Iraq and escalated the violence.  
3.7 The Role of Power   
The role of power in any societal divergence is important to investigate. Power has 
the ability to shape and frame choices in a way that limits the options of an indi-
vidual or social group to a restricted few. This forces such individuals or groups 
into a decision that forwards the agenda of the controlling party(ies). That is why 
this thesis characterizes power as an expression of illegitimate domination. Power 
can be defined as: 
“the ability of an individual or social group to pur-
sue a course of action, make decisions, and imple-
ment decisions, shaping the over all agenda for in-
dividuals and groups. If necessary, such actions are 
done against other individuals or social groups or 
in opposition to other individuals or social 
groups.”147 
Interests of the nation state can overlap with interests of social groups who view 
the reliability of the societal status quo as fundamental to the continued existence 
of the nation.148 In this way, it is explainable why many Iraqis construct the argu-
ment that the integrity of Islamic culture should be protected by the Muslim state. 
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These people understand that the character of their nation is dependent upon par-
ticular cultural and religious norms and values. Choices that are perceived as fall-
ing outside of this character are seen as degenerate and are limited by the control-
ling parties. These values also have a way of reinforcing the power wielded by the 
state or NSAs trying to overthrow the state.  
3.8 Al Gharib  
The divide between Sunnis and Shiites can be seen as a fault line in Iraqi society. 
With tensions between the two religious groups already high, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, a long time associate of Osama bin Laden, began actions for expelling 
the U.S. allied occupying force. Al-Zarqawi adopted a “two-pronged” strategy to 
alienate U.S. allies and destabilize the country.149 He sought to isolate U.S. forces 
by driving out its allies. More importantly, al-Zarqawi had the goal of precipitat-
ing civil war. He launched a series of attacks on the Shiite leadership, holy Shiite 
sites, and Shiite civilians on the street.150 Al-Zarqawi excelled in assassinations and 
destruction. In a letter to al-Zarqawi dated July 9, 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-
Qaeda questioned the wisdom of inflaming Sunni-Shiite hatred and al-Zarqawi 
became known within the Islamic resurgence movement as al Gharib (the foreign-
er) “because of his extreme views.”151 All of these actions were elements that led to 
the politics of religious persecution becoming a huge factor in Iraqi society.  
The concept of persecution must be delineated in a way that accounts for the 
various individuals and groups that this paper examines. Some persecutors would 
appear to have at least partial state sanction for their violent acts. Other persecu-
tors appear to have little more backing than their neighbors in segments of resi-
dential areas. Therefore persecution, in the most direct and significant sense, can 
be seen as an e ort by an organization, group, or government to repress activities 
by a given religious group, ordinarily with the goal of eliminating that group in 
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the long or short term. This paper has the di icult task of identifying nuances se-
parating religious persecution from other forms of repression in Iraq based on 
ethnic, racial, and political factors. Since the Sunni connection to the Ba’athist 
regime most certainly was the catalyst to the sectarian divide, can one properly 
describe Sunni persecution in strictly religious terminology? Presumably not, espe-
cially since Sunnis were often identified in the early days of the conflict simply by 
their last name. In this case, we should probably speak of a multi-pronged conflict 
rather than a strictly religious one. However, since religious identification has 
come to embody this conflict as a primary category by which both Iraqi insiders 
and outsiders classify it, understanding this conflict through the lens of religious 
persecution is warranted.  
3.9 Religious Legitimacy  
A second reason for looking at this conflict through a religious lens is the fact that, 
as Michael Hudson said thirty years ago, “the central problem of government to-
day in the Arab world is political legitimacy.152 This is as true today as it was when 
it was first stated. Political legitimacy in Iraq has come to be equated with reli-
gious legitimacy by various individuals and groups. Protestors against the present 
Iraqi status-quo often object on Islamic and Islamist grounds. However, these 
people are using a religious lens to protest and understand a political culture.  
First, if persecuted religious groups are to survive, they often do so by develop-
ing active and e ective military traditions.153 In a threatening environment, 
groups must often develop defenses. Second, groups that resist persecution often 
develop ideologies that explain their su ering and promise rewards for themselves 
and punishment for their persecutors.154 In opportune terms for this paper, this 
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means that persecuted groups are prone to martyrdom. Third, persecution can 
change the internal dynamic of a tradition, to concentrate power and prestige in 
the hands of a clerical elite.155 Such reality helped give rise to national Iraqi figures 
like Muqtada al-Sadr.  
3.10 Death in Iraq  
In October 2006, the British medical journal Lancet published a report on the 
killings in Iraq.156 This followed an earlier work in the journal published in 2004. 
The 2006 report surmised that the total deaths in Iraq between the period of 
March 2003 and July 2006 may have exceeded 650,000 people. The Lancet study 
has been condemned by U.S. and British policymakers, yet experts find it credi-
ble. If it proves to be true, then there has been a killing of Iraqis at a much higher 
number than had been predicted or has been reported. Added to such bloodshed 
has been the displacement of Iraqis in an unparalleled campaign of sectarian and 
ethnic cleansing. This displacement has a ected all of Iraqi society. The Brookings 
Institution-University of Berne Project on International Displacement has found 
that nearly 1.6 million people have been displaced internally since March 2003.157 
The Brookings-Berne report deals only with those displaced as a direct result of 
sectarian-induced violence. The report states that “by September 2006, nearly 
250,000 people had fled their homes because of fear, intimidation, or threats.”158 
Most of the displaced people have come from mixed neighborhoods of major ci-
ties such as Baghdad or Mosul. The report emphasizes that most of those dis-
placed since the Samarra bombings have been Sunnis fleeing from Shi’a areas. 
Such a report shows that community bonds that have previously kept Iraqi society 
resilient are disintegrating. Shiite power is showing signs of breaking down as well.  
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3.11 Iraqi Justice  
This forces us to ask the question of what types of representations of justice does 
Iraqi society generate? What are the rhetorics of such justice? What are the Iraqi 
cultural positions on justice? Conflicts are very ideological. Groups and individu-
als such as suicide bombers use the ethos of justice to help drive their conflicts. Yet 
this idea must be nuanced and we must ask ourselves what e ect the rhetoric of 
the extremists, be they political, cultural, or religious, has on NSAs such as suicide 
bombers.  
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declared war on Iraq’s Shi’a using the language of 
justified violence. In referring to the Shi’a as “the lurking snake, the crafty and ma-
licious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom” he declared them 
ku ar.159 Zarqawi did this claiming that it was in response to a U.S./Iraqi Army 
o ensive along the northwestern border with Syria. He claimed that Sunni Mus-
lims were being unfairly persecuted and that the Shi’a were to blame. With only a 
small contingent of Sunnis backing him, Zarqawi said he had “decided to launch a 
comprehensive war on the Shiites all over Iraq, wherever and whenever they are 
found. This is revenge…Take care because we are not going to have mercy on 
you.”160  
3.12 Iraqi Freedom  
Of special importance is the perceived religious persecution that Iraqi citizens un-
derstand themselves to be under as the victim of the U.S. led occupational force. 
For example, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (US-
CIRF) is a government agency tasked with monitoring religious freedom around 
the world and it advises the U.S. executive and legislative branches.  It was also 
tasked with incorporating strong protections for religious freedom in the new con-
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stitution of Iraq.161 As such, Iraqis have understood the campaign to secure reli-
gious freedom in Iraq as a Christian agenda to proselytize and convert Muslims to 
Christianity.162 Indeed, frustrated by the Islamic ban on conversions, would-be 
Christian missionaries have called for the removal of Islamic restrictions that ob-
struct their drive to convert Muslim Iraqis.163 Furthermore, this understanding 
that the promotion of religious freedom in Iraq was linked to the spreading of 
Christianity was reinforced by Kansas Senator Sam Brownback. Senator Brown-
back insisted that the Interim Iraqi Constitution incorporate the right to religious 
freedom. Brownback is a leader of the Christian right and shortly after he made 
his assertion Kyle Fisk of the National Association of Evangelicals proclaimed that 
a free Iraq would become the base for proselytizing throughout the Middle East.164  
Surveys show that Iraqis perceive themselves to be persecuted by the U.S. led 
coalition force. A poll conducted in August 2007 found that 79% of Iraqis op-
posed the presence of coalition forces, 80% disapproved of the way coalition 
forces had performed, and 86% had little to no confidence in the forces as a 
whole. More importantly, accusations of mistreatment were widespread. 41% re-
ported unnecessary violence against Iraqi citizens with an understood bias towards 
Islam and Arabs. 57% of Iraqis called attacks on coalition forces acceptable.165 
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Sunni clerics have used their podiums in mosques to encourage the public to sup-
port the insurgency and to call for holy war against the U.S. led coalition force.166  
3.13 Sacred Space in an Imagined Space  
The use of mosques to hide militants and weapons is another cause for Iraqis to 
see themselves as being persecuted by the largely Christian coalition force. Chris-
tian soldiers, within the boundaries of sacred space, no doubt o end the religious 
sensibilities of many Iraqi Muslims. Yet soldiers routinely raid mosques and find 
explosives, guns, ammunition, mortars, and so on.167 Counter-insurgency opera-
tions are understood to desecrate these religious spaces. Furthermore, assaults on 
these locations can and do result in damage to the religious sites that house these 
spaces. This damage can be physical but it can also be incorporeal. Sacred sites 
that have been defiled by infidels can be rendered profane. As such, coalition 
troops defiling a mosque by entering it can be seen as just as destructive as if they 
were to demolish the site completely. Various Muslim traditions take their own 
liberties in interpreting the restrictions on non-Muslims entering mosques. Saudi 
Arabia, for example, firmly disallows the entry of non-Muslims into a 15 mile 
zone around the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.168 More damaging than the de-
struction of sacred sites is the destruction of neighborhood communities.  
3.14 The Refugee Crises  
The conflict in Iraq increasingly bears the mark of sectarian polarization and 
“cleansing” in neighborhoods formerly of mixed religious orientation. Some argue 
that displacement has become a tool of war and the means for feuding networks 
and groups to establish territorial control. Overall living standards have declined 
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sharply. Direct personal threats, abductions, assassinations, and death are com-
monplace. Many middle-class and upper-class Iraqis with the means to leave have 
already done so. Religious belief, political or tribal a iliation, or association with 
occupational forces or Iraqi state authorities all can make someone a target for vi-
olence. Displacement can be the result of sectarian conflict and general armed vi-
olence, local criminal activity, military operations, and fighting among militias 
and insurgents, all of which have contributed to decreased security and an atmos-
phere of generalized fear for many ordinary Iraqis. The movement was predomi-
nantly in and between urban areas — with more than 70% fleeing Baghdad. In 
general throughout Iraq, patterns have shown that Shi’as have moved from the 
center to the south; Sunnis from the south to the upper center; Christians fled to 
Ninevah and Kurds ended up within Diyala or Kirkuk.169 
The violence and insecurity resulting from the ongoing sectarian strife, terror-
ism, and insurgency in Iraq have had a marked impact on civilian displacement in 
di erent parts of the country. Many of Iraq’s neighbors fear that they are being 
overwhelmed by refugees fleeing over Iraq’s borders. There are now heightened 
concerns about the absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, their ability to 
provide adequately for the populations moving across borders, and the impact of 
refugee flows on stability in general. It is possible that the Iraq situation could well 
begin to outpace other refugee crises worldwide. The refugee crises also attests to 
how complicated the current conflict is in Iraq. Contrary to Benjamin Barber’s 
view, all Muslim groups are not cooperating with one another in opposition to the 
West. Groups and movements within Iraq are in violent opposition to one anoth-
er. Yet coalition force spokesmen often frame Iraqi conflict as being the result of 
al-Qaeda interference. In order for a more accurate and nuanced view, conflict in 
Iraq must be seen as a variety of di erent concurrent movements as opposed to 
one monolithic phenomenon.  
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Bombs over Baghdad: 
How Militants Are Shaping Iraq Today 
Because of the social and historical demographics of Iraq, I argue that it is neces-
sary to understand Iraqi suicide bombings as a variety of di erent concurrent 
movements as opposed to one monolithic phenomenon. I demonstrate this mul-
tiple nature of the Iraqi insurgency by examining three di erent social groups and 
their movements. Given the understood sectarian a iliations within Iraq’s popula-
tion, religion is the single biggest signifier that is used by analysts to identify in-
surgent groups. Therefore, I focus on movements and groups within the typology 
of Sunni, Shi’a, and transnational. However, factional motivation must also be 
highlighted in order to further disaggregate the phenomena of suicide bombers. 
The Shi’ites, Sunnis, and transnationals are all characterized by di ering social 
bases, motivations, and organizing strategies. Each of these three groups in turn 
holds numerous tendencies within. The breakdowns are aimed at not only giving 
a typological structure to the Iraqi insurgency, but at flushing out subdivisions 
within each category. In this respect, the categories of insurgents outlined in this 
thesis are intended to be functional, assigning specific attributes to each category 
and sub category of violent actors which will better assist U.S. policymakers in 
identifying the strengths, weaknesses, and divisions between insurgent groups. 
4.1 Collective Identity Among Violent Actors  
Violent actors who operate within or in the name of the groups covered in this 
chapter foster a sense of social and collective identity. Social identity is defined as:  
that part of an individual’s self-concept which de-
rives from his knowledge of his membership of a 
social group (or groups), together with the value 
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and emotional significance attached to that mem-
bership.170  
This is a limited definition of identity but it is helpful because it is a definition 
that assumes that some aspects of an individual’s view of him- or herself are con-
tributed by an understood social membership. Identity is related to a particular 
group’s common sense psychology which suggests a set of ideologies and rationali-
zations about causes in everyday life. These explanations serve the function of legi-
timating actions including violent ones. Narratives are therefore an important ob-
ject of study in this chapter. Narratives can be defined as constituting a collection 
of stories, beliefs, aspirations, experiences, histories and current explanations that a 
group holds about itself and about its surroundings.171 They coherently inter-
relate historical and recent events and provide a larger meaning system into which 
social identities are incorporated. 172 This includes how violent actors construct 
social reality and make inferences about causes in daily life. These explanations are 
to a large extent historical in that they are specific to particular periods and tend 
to change over time.173 Therefore, this chapter will address Iraq’s recent history as 
well as the most powerful groups who operate within it in order to investigate the 
country’s current narratives of violent actors and suicide attacks.  
Typically, actors engage in suicide bombings when (1) a national community 
is occupied by a foreign power; (2) the foreign power is of a di erent religion; and 
(3) the foreign power is a democracy.174 Of nine occupations that have bred sui-
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cide bombers, eight met all three conditions, and the last, the Turkish Kurds, met 
two.175 Therefore, suicide terrorism is a brutal tactic for collective liberation. Sui-
cide attacks occur on the whole as a part of an organized and coherent campaign 
where individual after individual voluntarily kills him or herself as a method to 
eliminate the maximum number of people in a target force, community, or socie-
ty. This can be executed with the intention of forcing a state to end an occupa-
tional campaign.  
A recurring problem in the study of Iraq’s violent conflict is a lack of data that 
have the breadth, depth, and historical accuracy to provide insight as to why, at 
the individual level, people are participating in the disruption of the status quo 
through suicide attacks. The challenge is to construct a theoretical bridge to facili-
tate interaction between the state and organized NSAs who are in a competition 
for control. The individuals and groups who fuel both sides of this competition 
base decisions to participate in violent conflict on a framework founded in ration-
al actor theory that has been modified by their perception of culture, community, 
and religion. Groups who wish to recruit individuals into their insurgency apply 
incentives and disincentives selectively to compel membership. These incentives 
can include coercion through economic, cultural, or religious appeal as well as 
outright force.  
NSAs who engage in suicide bombings are competing with the state through 
political rebellion and destructive force in order to bring about change at the so-
cietal and political level. The suicide bomber’s goal is the modification of authori-
ty within a state. A prolonged movement of suicide terrorism requires significant 
community support in order for the violent actors to be accepted as martyrs and 
to replace their membership. The networks of NSAs engaged in suicide terrorism 
hope that their martyr propaganda will influence social responses to suicide at-
tacks. Positive social responses are paramount because a full scale insurgency re-
quires control. Suicide bombings require monetary funds to support the construc-
tion of bombs and the payments to families of suicide bombers. Networks that 
fuel suicide bombings in Iraq therefore require control at local levels to ensure 
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profits from other illegal activities such as drug smuggling, kidnapping, and mer-
cenary killings.176 Consequently, these networks maximize their financial gains 
through localized control of neighborhoods and communities. To attain the ulti-
mate goal of liberation from occupation, violent groups similarly require control 
at the local level.  
When societal responses are not positive and do not adequately facilitate 
NSAs such as suicide bombers, these actors turn to the tactics of coercion and in-
timidation. Coercion has the ability to manipulate a community and the commu-
nity’s perceptions of society within which it exists. The individuals within a com-
munity share a common framework for assessing the values of benefits and costs 
in making rational decisions. This in turn a ects the control that a network of 
violent actors has over an individual. The dynamic of control by an individual or 
group allows for the shaping of the expectations of the associated costs of action 
both within a community and within a nation-state. As individuals believe in the 
controls of violent NSAs, the power of violent NSAs grows.177 The result is a self-
perpetuating mechanism of control over both the individual and the community.  
Individuals participate in violent acts such as suicide bombings because their 
perspective of society leads them to rebellion against occupation. The decision to 
participate in suicide attacks comes about because the individual determines that 
participation is the most e ective means to achieve his or her desires. In other 
words, suicide terrorism works. Would-be suicide bombers make reasonable as-
sessments of the relationship between the bomber’s coercive e orts and the politi-
cal gains that have been achieved in past conflicts. Violent NSAs, like all people, 
learn from experience. However, the analysis here seeks to determine why NSAs 
are increasingly attracted to the specific coercive strategy of suicide attacks. At the 
core of the decisions addressed in this thesis is the rational choice model of deci-
sion making. Individuals are rational beings. Individuals weigh the benefit of ac-
tion and the expectation of receiving that benefit minus the cost of the decision 
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and the expectation of receiving that decision. NSAs are any individual or group 
who desire to wield control over a fixed political space. Their motives may be reli-
gious or they may be economic; in any case the NSA desires to usurp the authori-
ty of the existing state to achieve its own agenda.  
Iraqi NSAs are in a constant state of competition with the Iraqi government. 
They apply incentives selectively to individuals to compel submission or member-
ship. A selective incentive is any input, benefit or cost, in a rational decision that 
provides a motive or deterrence for an individual to take a particular course of ac-
tion, or counts as a reason for preferring one choice to any alternatives. The incen-
tives are not universal to everyone, nor are they always applied. NSAs with control 
in a community apply incentives or disincentives to influence the rational decision 
making of specific individuals and groups. In Iraq, NSAs use threats of violence 
towards individuals to gain compliance. For example, Sunni suicide bombings are 
often but not always an example of the multi-faceted Sunni insurgency which has 
targeted Shi’a groups with the intention of insuring that the Shi’a continue to ac-
quiesce to the Sunni Arabs’ political authority. NSAs use personal harm as a disin-
centive for going against them.  
Expectations are directly linked to selective incentives and the general percep-
tion of benefits and costs. Individuals associate an expectation of receiving a 
benefit or cost when they make rational decisions. Individuals also tie expectations 
to the selective incentives based on the credibility of the individual o ering them. 
Therefore, it is easy to understand why Iraqi NSAs from both the Shi’a and Sunni 
sects established themselves as capable of violence early on in the occupation. The 
knowledge that a network or group is capable of inflicting harm, even at the ex-
pense of their own person, provides high expectations of costs. It is dangerous to 
clash with them.  
The reasons individuals resort to becoming suicide bombers are troubling and 
di icult to understand. One of the first steps to understanding suicide bombers is 
to look at how they are able to develop the control necessary to get groups or 
communities to give a positive social response to allow for bomber replenishment 
and monetary support. To explain the reasons for participation, this thesis has de-
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veloped a framework that explains why and how an individual or group makes 
decisions that lead them to become violent NSAs and suicide bombers.  
This theory starts from the basis that individuals are rational actors. Using the 
rational actor as the foundation, this thesis can define how suicide bombers are 
able to recruit from the communities they a ect. Within the supply based analysis 
of insurgencies developed by Lietes and Wolf,178 it is explained that by using selec-
tive incentives, a network of violent actors are able to mobilize resources. Within 
this section we are looking at examples of mobilizing participation and the devel-
opment of coercion. This thesis argues that when common frameworks are estab-
lished and understood throughout a community, then the control that the suicide 
bomber has developed will be clear to see. 
Through research, this thesis has identified specific cultural and environmen-
tal characteristics that contribute to suicide bombings. These characteristics are 
viewed as additional conditions. These characteristics are not directly tied to sui-
cide bombings but further explain why individuals participate in such acts of vio-
lent expression. These additional conditions explain the phenomenon that gives 
actors specific values for cost, benefit, and expectations for rational decisions. This 
author also believes that these additional conditions also need to be understood to 
see a more nuanced picture of why people become suicide bombers.  
Individuals decide to act as described by the rational actor model. An actor 
weighs the value of the benefit and the expectation of receiving that benefit, minus 
the value of cost and the expectation of that cost to determine whether to partici-
pate in a suicide attack. The equation is simple. The important aspect of the equa-
tion is that it is continuously being applied to all decisions. Any group or network 
that exerts control through coercion over a community can change the 
significance of the community’s cultural norms and values. Therefore, it is possible 
to derive motivators for making single decisions and place them in the overall 
framework of a positive societal response. The outcome of this process is a deter-
mination of how shared norms and values provide information that actors use in 
making decisions when a violent network has control over community hegemony.  
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An actor will work towards its preferences but selective incentives will con-
struct boundaries around an actor’s actions. The ultimate qualifier for communi-
ties to support suicide bombings is a change in community control exerted by a 
group or state other than the recognized state or government. When looking at a 
suicide bomber’s environment, all decisions are greatly influenced by the coercion 
and control exerted in a community. Suicide bomber networks are able to exist 
because they have established control over time. As violent actors establish their 
ability to control large communities, states see a reduction in their ability to wield 
authority.  
Networks and organizations only implement suicide attacks if their communi-
ty approves of its use.179 “A careful study of all the organizations that have resorted 
to terrorism since 1983 suggested that the most meaningful distinction among 
them involves the degree to which suicide bombing is institutionalized.”180 Brian 
Jenkins, a terrorism expert, agrees. “I think we’d all agree that suicide bombing is 
abnormal. The fact that abnormal behavior is applauded in the community 
reflects abnormal conditions. If normal conditions are restored, then normal be-
havior should return—at least they would be less tolerant of abnormal beha-
vior.”181 Why would a community view suicide bombing as an accepted norm and 
value? The main reasons assuredly include military occupation and/or deplorable 
economic and social conditions. 
4.2 Transnational Actors  
The collapse of the Ba’athist regime created a tremendous power vacuum in Iraq 
which had used a repressive state security mechanism to keep control of the popu-
lace. The overnight disappearance of this form of authoritarian control allowed a 
multitude of independently motivated groups to pursue their own individual in-
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terests. In this way, the transnational actors may be the most diverse typology of 
the Iraqi suicide attacks, incorporating a variety of di erent religious, social, na-
tional, ethnic, and economically motivated groups. Despite this, they all contain 
similarities, and for the purpose of this work I define transnational insurgents us-
ing two criteria: those insurgents who have a greater interest in their specific 
group, organization, or political agenda, than in the future of the state of Iraq; and 
insurgent groups with “sustained continuous interactions with opponents—
national or non-national—by connected networks of challengers across national 
boundaries.”182 Iraq’s three largest transnational groups are the 1) Islamic militants, 
2) Kurdish elements, and 3) economically motivated criminal groups. For the 
purpose of this thesis I will di erentiate between religiously motivated indigenous 
Iraqis and Abdullah Azzam influenced jihadists. I will classify jihadists as transna-
tional, ideologically motivated fighters who use religion as their justification for 
acts of violence “directed against people they believe are their enemies and the 
enemies of their way of life.”183  
4.3 Sunni Actors  
Indigenous actors are also important to examine. Concentrated in central Iraq, the 
Sunni have been the ruling minority over Iraq’s Shi’a for centuries, reaping the 
social, political, and economic rewards of their position. The toppling of Saddam 
Hussein’s government brought an end to this system and largely disenfranchised 
many of Iraq’s traditional power structures. Many of these power structures had 
been revitalized by Saddam Hussein in the past few decades in an attempt by the 
former dictator to consolidate his power within Iraq. These traditional power 
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structures take the shape of tribes in Iraq, and their significance, as well as their 
past relations with Saddam Hussein’s regime, are possibly the most misunderstood 
aspects of history with regard to the coalition’s current policy in Iraq. For the pur-
pose of this thesis, a tribe is defined as a collection of “a iliated clans (who) claim 
to have a common lineage or descent.”184 The clans that make up a tribe are fur-
ther divided into sub-clans, which are eventually made up of extended family 
groupings, and finally single families.  
The legacy of this reversal for the Sunnis has been the rise of a multi-faceted 
Sunni insurgency, which can be generally divided into Sunni tribal insurgent 
groups, Sunni former régime loyalists (FRL), Sunni nationalists, and Sunni Islam-
ists. While Sunni tribal groups are largely concerned with their regional power and 
prestige vis-à-vis neighboring tribes, FRL are mainly motivated by a general desire 
to nationally reestablish the “Old Guard” in power, or at a minimum, prevent this 
power from falling into the hands of the Shi’a. With the capture of many high-
ranking Ba’athists, the FRL have become operationally inactive, functioning large-
ly as financiers of other groups. Iraqi nationalists gained many of their numbers 
from FRL groups, and are motivated primarily by their desire to expel foreign 
forces to insure that Sunni Arabs retain the political authority in Iraq. Indigenous 
Iraqi, Sunni Arab Islamists are another sub-category, acting as a cohesive force be-
tween some insurgent groups, and allowing for cooperation between Sunni groups 
and transnational jihadists. For the purposes of this thesis, the “Sunni” categoriza-
tion of the insurgency is used for Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. While the majori-
ty of Iraq’s Kurds are also Sunni, they are identified with their own distinction. 
As has been mentioned, Sunni Muslims only make up approximately 18% of 
Iraq’s population. In general, they are concentrated in a roughly drawn triangle 
between Tikrit in the North, Ramadi in the West, and Baghdad in the East, creat-
ing a region known as the “Sunni Triangle.” This region provides Sunni identified 
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violent actors with the ability to move freely and openly in terrain that they are 
not only familiar with, but which also a ords them the ability to maintain exten-
sive support networks. The Sunnis have been a ruling minority over Iraq’s Shi’ites 
for centuries. Even prior to the Ba’athists, Ottoman Sunnis had run Iraq for cen-
turies, eventually replaced by British installed Sunni Arabs, who filled the coun-
try’s top political seats.185 The rise of the Ba’athists in Iraq not only continued, but 
took this legacy of a Sunni minority rule to a new level, empowering this popula-
tion with the wealth of Iraq’s natural resources. In the spring of 2003, however, 
the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government brought an end to this system. This 
section examines Iraq’s Sunni population, interpreting its preferential treatment 
under the Ba’athists as background to the roots of Iraq’s Sunni insurgency. Despite 
their historical minority rule, Arab Sunnis benefited further by the rise of the 
Ba’athists to power. 
Sunni domination was not always the case within the Ba’ath party, and in 
many respects, Iraq’s Shi’ites were useful in bringing the Ba’ath party to power. 
Once in place however, the party’s Shi’ites were successively driven out of powerful 
positions. Before 1968, the Shi’ites had substantially more power within the Iraqi 
Ba’ath party. From 1952 until 1963, Iraq’s Shi’ites maintained 53.8% of the par-
ty’s 53 top command seats, in comparison to the Sunnis’ 38.5%.186 With the rise 
of the Ba’ath party to power in 1968, this fairly representative demographic 
changed greatly. Between 1963 and 1970, Arab Sunnis came to hold 84.9% of the 
party’s top commands, with Arab Shi’ites in only 5.7% of the top positions.187 By 
1977, the disparity had grown and Sunni Arabs thoroughly dominated the Ba’ath 
party, holding 93.3% of the organization’s top command posts.188 The locations 
from which the party’s members came were also heavily concentrated in central 
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Iraq, with an increasing number of upper echelon party o icials and decision 
makers hailing from Saddam Hussein’s home town of Tikrit. 
In 1979, Saddam Hussein took power. In the years that followed, due to the 
country’s oil wealth, the GNP multiplied. “[B]y the early 1980s, the state bureau-
cracy was about 25 percent of the total workforce, and a new class of entrepre-
neurs, contractors and managers reaped much of the benefits of Iraq’s wealth.”189 
This new middle class of government bureaucrats and contract employees was 
heavily Arab Sunni, bringing the country’s new oil money and investment into 
central Iraq. Other major government programs devoted to housing, literacy, 
health, and education catered to the Arab Sunnis as well, focusing largely on ur-
ban areas in central Iraq and depriving the Iraqi north and Shi’ite southern areas 
of an equitable distribution of money and resources.190 Opposition movements 
and uprisings by the Kurds and Shi’ites fueled Hussein’s neglect of these areas. 
While Iraq’s economy su ered greatly in the 1990s, socio-economic disparity be-
tween Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’ite populations continued to grow, and by the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, southern Iraq had been devastated by poverty and years of neg-
lect. The implementation of United Nations-imposed sanctions failed to dislodge 
the regime. Instead, the result was Hussein’s manipulation of the allocation of ba-
sic social services, aid, and foodstu  distribution in order to keep the Kurds and 
Shi’ites under control.191  
Prior to the mid-1980s the Ba’ath Party had a relatively adversarial relation-
ship with Iraq’s tribes. Upon taking power in 1968, the Ba’athists issued their first 
public communiqué, opposing traditional linkages by stating that the Ba’athists 
“are against religious sectarianism, racism, and tribalism.”192 There were a variety 
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of philosophical and practical reasons why the Ba’athists initially sought to weaken 
and marginalize Iraq’s tribal networks. Ba’athism is an activist, revolutionary and 
modernizing political ideology, focused on “e ecting a structural transformation 
in the spirit and thinking of the Arab people which would revolutionize their so-
ciety.”193 It is based on the “trinity” of unity, freedom, and socialism which became 
manifested in modern, secular socialism and pan-Arabism.194 This clearly runs 
counter to traditional tribal-based notions of governance. Iraq’s new Ba’athists saw 
tribalism as an antiquated system, which eroded their principles of pan-Arabism 
and Iraqi nationalism. Whereas Ba’athism is centered on the predominance of the 
state, traditional tribalism produces a sub-national network of loyalties. These 
loyalties hold familial bonds the strongest and allegiances weaken as one moves 
farther from the family, through the tribal chain and into general society. Because 
of this, Ba’athists came to view tribalism as an alternate social support structure 
and form of legitimacy that challenged the primacy of the Iraqi state. Further, 
Iraq’s rural-based tribal sheikhs also represented a competing social class, as the 
Ba’athist ranks were largely made up of lower-middle class youths from urban 
areas.195  
4.4 Shi’a Actors  
Violent actors from the Shi’a represent a social group which had been previously 
disenfranchised within the country. Whereas many of the Sunni actors are violent 
because they have lost power, the Shi’ite actors arose largely to insure that they get 
power in a system that has historically excluded and repressed them. While Sunni 
elites have ruled the territory that we now know as the state of Iraq for the better 
part of the last millennium, Iraq’s Shi’a comprise the numerical majority of its 
population. Due to the minority Sunni rule in this region, no current accurate 
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census results are available on the exact number of Shi’a in Iraq. British census 
data from1919 estimated the number of Shi’a in Iraq as 53% of its population, 
and this number was adjusted in 1932 to reflect that Shi’a accounted for 56% of 
the populace.196 Recent estimates on the number of Shi’ites in Iraq are even high-
er, indicating that they account for between 60 and 65 % of Iraq’s 24 million citi-
zens.197  
Using his familial ties, clerical relationships, and Iraqi national identity, Muq-
tada al-Sadr became a centerpiece for the rise of the Shi’a Mahdi Army. Through 
the successful exploitation of common Iraqi desires for jobs, security, and a coali-
tion withdrawal, al-Sadr was able to build a following from the poor Shi’ite com-
munities of Iraq. This paper must examine Muqtada al-Sadr’s personal and famili-
al characteristics, which enabled him to rapidly gain a short-lived burst of 
popularity and create a Shi’ite insurgency in Iraq.  
The popularity of Muqtada al-Sadr among Iraqi Shi’ites and his ability to rally 
such a large number of supporters in a short period of time can be attributed to 
several factors. His familial ties and tribal connections are probably his greatest 
credits, as al- Sadr was a household name that had been associated with Shi’ite 
activism in Iraq well before Muqtada had begun his clerical studies. Muqtada al-
Sadr is the son of former Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and nephew 
of former Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr. Considered to be “the most 
prominent intellectual figure among the Shi’a radical ulama of post-monarchic 
Iraq”, Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr was one of the founders of the Shi’ite Da’wa Par-
ty, and directly responsible for bringing the fundamentalist notion of Islamic gov-
ernment into Iraq.198 The murder of Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr at the hands of 
Iraqi security forces in April of 1980 only helped to increase the al-Sadr family’s 
                                                 
196 Yitzhak Nakash, “The Shi’is of Iraq,” (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2003) 13 
197  A. William Samii, “Shia Political Alternatives in Postwar Iraq,” in Middle East 
Policy Council Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 2003), available from 
http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol10/0306_samii.asp  
198  Nakash, 137 
 70
standing as martyrs for the Iraqi Shi’ite cause. In a culture where familial ties and 
tribal a iliations are extremely important, Muqtada al-Sadr’s family also holds 
sayyid status, which maintains that he is a direct descendent of the Prophet Mo-
hammed.199 Beyond his tribal a iliations, the fact that the al-Sadr family is of Iraqi 
origin in a society where the majority of ranking Shi’ite clerics have been of Ira-
nian origin, is also extremely significant. Muqtada has been able to use this to his 
advantage, giving the fundamentalist Mahdi Army an Iraqi nationalist flavor, 
which has greatly increased the appeal of the al-Sadr movement among Iraqi 
Shi’ites. The Sadrists are a populist movement in a nation dominated by outside 
forces—in this case the US and Iran—and they are a movement of the dispos-
sessed, i.e., not the ruling class. In other words, al-Sadr gives his Shi’a followers a 
means to defy the Coalition Occupational Force as well as Iran. An example is al-
Sadr giving his followers permission to ignore an order given by the Coalition 
Force and Iraqi government which would have had the Mahdi Army disarm.200 
Al-Sadr said his Mahdi Army would turn in its weapons only to a government 
that “can get the occupier out of Iraq.”201 
It is notable to mention al-Sadr’s relationship with hard-liner Iranian Grand 
Ayatollah Kazem al-Ha’eri, supporter of the precedence of Islamic law in govern-
ment, and close friends with al-Sadr’s father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr. Upon his 
death, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr had left instructions that his 
followers take direction from Grand Ayatollah Kazem al- Ha’eri, and since May of 
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2003, frequent visits between al-Sadr and clerics in Tehran have caused security 
o icials to pay even more attention to this connection.202  
The violent Shi’a actors under the al-Sadr Movement in Iraq have three 
specific stated goals: the preservation of Muqtada al-Sadr from imprisonment; the 
expulsion of foreign forces from Iraq; and the establishment of a Shi’ite Islamic 
government in Iraq based on Khomeini’s model in Iran.203 When looking at Iraq’s 
other actor groupings, the only commonality that the Shi’a actors have with the 
Sunni and transnational actors is the expulsion of coalition forces from Iraq. Of 
course al-Sadr does not represent all of the violent Shi’a actors in Iraq. At the on-
set of hostilities between the Mahdi Army and coalition forces in May of 2004, 
Muqtada al-Sadr was at the height of his popularity, boasting a 68% popularity 
rating among Iraq’s estimated 15 million Shi’ites.204 However, only 2% of Iraq’s 
Shi’a approved of al-Sadr as a presidential candidate at that time.205  
4.5 Uncertain Future  
The discourse within Iraq has been directed in varied and numerous directions. 
These include nationalism, liberalism, socialism, capitalism, Islamic extremism, 
and Islamic moderation. The Shi’a acceptance and attitude toward their state 
loyalty, religion, sect, and ethnicity has been one of the main driving points of 
friction in the country. How do members of Iraqi’s Shi’a community feel they 
were and are treated? Do they believe that they will have a better say in govern-
ment policymaking in the future?  What kind of state will the new Iraq be? Will 
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the population be run by majority rule? Do abused state citizens still have a na-
tional loyalty to the state they were abused under? The Sunni acceptance and atti-
tude towards these same issues is in many ways ad hoc. The leadership class of the 
former Ba’athist regime, as well as those Sunnis who prospered under the regime, 
have formed a base of violent resistance. Their main targets have been coalition 
forces and the Shi’a, who they believe have been executing Sunnis as revenge 
against the Ba’athist regime.206  
Since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the central provinces in Iraq 
have been the most violent, with the greatest number of insurgent incidents and 
the strongest anti-coalition resistance. It is in an accommodating environment 
that Iraq’s violent Sunni actors have increased their hostility, carrying out their 
planning, recruitment, training, and operations in the shadow of coalition forces. 
Suicide bombings, as well as armed attacks, and intimidation campaigns are part 
of daily life in central Iraq. Since the spring of 2003, over 35 Sunni Arab insur-
gent groups have claimed responsibility for acts of violence throughout Iraq.207 
Reappearance errors are possible, as certain groups on the Arab street may use 
multiple names or may have changed their name. It is also likely that smaller local 
groups exist which coalition sources have not yet identified. Beyond the sheer 
number of Sunni insurgent groups, “an overwhelming majority of those captured 
or killed have been Iraqi Sunnis, as well as around 90-95% of those detained.”208 
The ambiguity of players in Iraq’s violence, as well as their possible motives, 
are complicated even more by the fact that bombs are easy to make. “Improvised 
explosives, such as military and commercial explosives, are typically mixtures of an 
                                                 
206  Allawi, 136  
207  Cordesman, Anthony H. “The Developing Iraqi Insurgency: Status at End-
2004” (Working Draft), (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies Publishers, 22 December 2006), 12  
208  Ibid 
73 
oxidizer and fuel.”209 Anyone with a basic chemistry background can produce 
gunpowder. This is done by simply combining charcoal (Carbon) with Sulfur, and 
Salt Peter (Potassium Nitrate). Such a combination is favored by militants in the 
Middle East.210  
4.6 The Making of an Iraqi Suicide Bomber 
This section will demonstrate why individuals, especially young males, become 
suicide bombers. By using the methodology proposed earlier in this chapter, it is 
possible to derive the motivations for becoming a suicide bomber and then place 
them in the perspective of the overall decision making process of a rational actor. 
The outcome of this process is a determination of how an actor understands val-
ues for costs and benefit that he or she as an individual uses in making decisions.  
Within an Iraqi community, children get their first exposure to suicide bomb-
ers through aspects of the society around them. An individual develops his or her 
cognition from observing the news and print media, movies, fashion, compa-
nions, and family. Groups within a community may exert influence such as peer 
pressure; however, a youth is interpreting all of the inputs that he or she sees and 
experience. Some aspects romanticize suicide bombers, and some do not. All as-
pects leave an impression. The youth who participate in suicide attacks do so out 
of a desire to belong to a movement and for the gain of prestige, funds for their 
family, and communal power.211 These youth feel a need to prove themselves to 
their desired cherished community. Some youth will participate in a suicide attack 
for the power gained through a violent religious expression. These youth become 
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martyred and gain a reputation as religious warriors. The networks that produce 
suicide bombers can provide peers for socialization. These networks can provide 
identity, discipline, recognition, belonging, and money.212 Youth on the Arab 
street see that these networks have the prospect of providing these things and are 
intrigued by the lifestyle.  
Talal Asad suggests that the motives behind suicide bombings are rarely lucid, 
are always invested with emotion, and their description can be contested.213 He 
says that motives may not be clear even to the actor.214 Most importantly, Asad 
explains that motives depend on typologies of action that are conventionally rec-
ognized and to which individuation is central.215 For Asad, the uniqueness of the 
suicide bomber resides not in its essence but in its contingent circumstances. Such 
circumstances in Iraq are often ones of insecurity.  
Iraqi communities by and large lack security control except for community 
militias and the occasional patrol of Iraqi national police and occupation forces. 
Supervision can be limited due to the violent nature of the neighborhoods. There 
are few financial prospects for youth to desire.216 Overall, these communities have 
a lack of formal or informal national social structures that are perceived in a posi-
tive light. Such reality can also infrequently cause an older Iraqi to commit a sui-
cide attack. This is because the lack of financial and communal opportunities 
leave an ideological vacuum which Iraqis fill with other cultural aspects or institu-
tions from their society.  
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Cultural aspects or institutions can be transformative. In the case of an Iraqi 
suicide bomber, they can be liberating. Culture, society, and religion are abstrac-
tions which have a historically and geographically specific character.217 Therefore, 
these aspects or institutions are attractive to Iraqi actors because they resonate 
with a particular system of beliefs that they have an a inity for. Here, culture can 
help Iraqi actors navigate the divide between Western and Iraqi civilization, Sunni 
and Shi’a communities, and Islamic and Islamist ideologies. Cultural narratives 
can be intensifiers of thought, belief, and action. Western media reduce Iraq’s cul-
ture to religion. However, religion is neither essential nor su icient to understand-
ing the diverse cultures within Iraq. Then again, religion can be a powerful ele-
ment in suicidal attacks. Analysis of religion can be used to explain suicidal attacks 
as acts of liberation.  
Liberation is the term given to a desire to overcome, circumvent, or ameliorate 
an unacceptable condition of being whether that condition is individual or com-
munal.218 Since Iraqi NSAs who participate in suicidal attacks come from all walks 
of life and regions within the Middle East, it is di icult to favor any particular 
state of a airs which an actor is trying to overcome. Any number of issues pertain-
ing to Western occupation, sectarianism, secularism, and political turmoil can be 
seen as causal. In the case of religion, the nature of Islamic traditions to provide 
for their adherents an ontology of who or what they are, either in the form of 
cosmology or an anthropology, as a mode of actualization is particularly power-
ful.219 Religion can give a suicide bomber the rationale that performing an attack 
can be a form of religious action. Suicide bombers seek to transform their unac-
ceptable reality by blowing themselves up in the name of liberating themselves or 
their communities from such a condition.  
Suicide bombers strive to shift their formal identity through their destructive 
actions. This shift is not a wholesale change of character. It is a transformation 
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where the actor is challenging the ideology of Iraqi domestic policy. The actor is 
attempting to transform him or herself from a nondescript citizen into an agent 
for change. The actor is transforming his or her state of being with the intention 
of transforming the status-quo of the state. In this way, the social behavior of sui-
cide bombers can be explained through rational intentionality. Here it is impor-
tant not to use Western rationality as a judgmental yardstick.220 However, it is safe 
to say that these actors believe in their fight for liberation and see their actions as 
justified. They are no longer common citizens of the Iraqi nation but instead mar-
tyrs functioning to influence and change the Iraqi state. For the suicide bomber, 
the benefit of changing an unacceptable condition in Iraq outweighs the cost of 
killing oneself and others.  
A fuller evaluation as to the rationality of suicide bombers in Iraq is di icult 
to make because we as scholars lack total knowledge about suicide attacks and the 
attackers themselves. What we can say is exactly what this thesis argues—that is 
suicide bombers in Iraq are not solely driven by religion but by motivations drawn 
from a number of sources including a strategic objective to gain state and com-
munity influence and status. Such objective has been brought on by state condi-
tions which actors and communities perceive as unacceptable. These state condi-
tions are predicated on Western occupation. Empirical evidence backs up this 
assertion. Prior to Iraq’s occupation in 2003, Iraq had never experienced a suicide 
attack in its history.221 Since the occupation, suicide attacks have rapidly escalated. 
Iraq had 20 suicide attacks in 2003, 49 attacks in 2004, and 125 attacks in 
2005.222  
The biographies of suicide bombers in Iraq are unclear. The best information 
available is that suicide bombers are primarily Sunni Iraqis and Transnational ac-
tors.223 The Transnationals come primarily from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Ku-
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wait.224 If this holds to be true, this could mean that suicide bombers in Iraq are 
either Iraqi themselves or from countries immediately adjacent to Iraq whose so-
cieties are most vulnerable to the volatility and Western threat of Iraq’s occupa-
tion. These suicide bombers are not from the Middle East’s largest Islamist popu-
lations (Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Sudan) and therefore cannot be understood 
as Islamist actors. This backs up the argument of this thesis that religion generally 
and Islamic extremism specifically is not the primary foundation for suicide ter-
rorism. Members of suicide bombers in Iraq are no more and no less religious 
than other individuals. Religion is simply one element in motivation for and ex-
planation of such behavior.  
                                                 





Where Do We Go from Here?  
Religious di erence has long been a focus of conflict. However, in our post Cold 
War reality, religion has replaced political ideology as a favored explanatory con-
tributor of conflict by American policymakers, the American national security es-
tablishment, and the media. Societal grievances are widely expressed in the lan-
guage of religious extremism. Yet a more accurate and nuanced ground to explain 
such grievances can only be found in the dynamic of inclusion. Americans must 
include a number of causes for such grievances instead of simply reducing them to 
being based exclusively on religion. Americans must therefore practice more dia-
logical openness in regards to other cultures and religions. If they do not, they will 
continue to perpetuate misinformation.  
5.1 Toward Better Western Understandings of Islam 
By mixing Islamist militants like al-Qaeda together with secular rogue states like 
Iraq, the doctrine of President George W. Bush over simplified U.S. understand-
ings of Muslims and the Middle East. He claimed that there were strong ties be-
tween al-Qaeda and Iraq. He said that he believed that Iraq was involved in 9/11 
but that he did not have “the evidence” to link bin Laden with Hussein.225 Even 
though this belief proved to be factually incorrect, many Americans still see such a 
partnership as probable since Muslims are depicted through Orientalism as a ho-
mogenous community with few divergent representations.   
The image of an alien and barbaric Islam has been ingrained in U.S. popular 
discourse for the past 200 years. Such an image is evident from nineteenth-
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century ballads to Disney’s movie Aladdin.226 In order to move beyond such a 
simplistic and inaccurate image, Americans need to avoid the impulse to couch 
Islamic misunderstanding in the framework of civilizational warfare. In order to 
better understand the complexities of Islam, American discourse needs to employ 
an expansive definition of the Middle East to encompass not merely Israel, the 
Arab states, and Iraq but also the diverse communities and cultures which make 
up these regions. It is with this intention that this thesis was designed to provide a 
general reader with a broad understanding of how Americans have equated Islamic 
religious traditions with suicide attacks inside Iraq. This thesis has sought to dispel 
such misunderstandings to give a more accurate representation of Islam.  
5.2 Constructing Iraqi Identity  
Having been the main architects of the long process of constructing an Iraqi iden-
tity and forging an Iraqi state, the Arab Sunni minority was assuredly dissatisfied 
with their loss of power after the demise of the Ba’athist regime in April 2003. 
Though they are not made up of a monolithic community and many disagree on 
basic issues, it can be safely assumed that most Iraqi Sunnis, and possibly others in 
Iraq, agree on some principles for the future of their country. They would like a 
safe and peaceful Iraq in its current boundaries, contrary to separatist tendencies 
espoused in Kurdish discourse of today. Internally, the ideal Sunni Iraq would pre-
ferably be run along centralist lines, contrary to the prevailing rhetoric of federal-
ism expounded by the Shi’a and Kurds. The country would be understood by its 
citizens as predominantly Arab, with strong links to the surrounding Arab world. 
Arabness and Iraqi identity could serve as a bridge between Shi’a and Sunni secta-
rianism.  
Whether the Sunnis get their way or not, they may hold the key to the preser-
vation of a united Iraq. They were the dominant force in the shaping of Iraqi na-
tional identity, albeit in a poor way. Of the three main population groups, they are 
the most enthusiastic in using it as a rallying force. Like other Iraqis, they are 
looking toward the future: Very few Sunnis wish for a return to the Ba’athist past. 
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Therefore, they should be an essential part of a national dialogue toward a 
redefinition of Iraqi identity.  
5.3 The Iraq Refugee Crisis 
There have been no reliable census data on Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian makeup for 
decades. As has been explained, Iraq’s population represents a number of ethnic 
groups and religious traditions. In recent studies, the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) found that Iraqi refugees fleeing violence tend to be from 
mixed neighborhoods and are displaced to homogenous ones.227 Furthermore, dai-
ly behavior by those who are displaced or living in fear for their lives may also vary 
to avoid establishing any predictable pattern. Micro and nighttime displacement is 
used to describe a person living in his or her home, but sleeping else where. Day-
light displacement involves shifting routines, routes, and activities. And false dis-
placements are those who pretend to be displaced and build homes on govern-
ment land or the land of locals.228 Such realities do not bode well for the future of 
Iraq. The potential for persecution, religious and otherwise, is heightened by the 
chaotic nature that Iraqi communities are operating in. How these communities 
will adapt to and understand the fallout to displacement has yet to be seen.  
5.4 Future Security Issues 
It has proven extremely di icult for occupational forces and Iraqi police to provide 
security against suicidal attacks. While this paper seeks a better understanding of 
those who kill themselves and others, such an assessment is of little help to the 
innocent people who have already lost their lives. History shows that foreign 
combat forces in prized territory are a principle recruiting tool to mobilize suicide 
bombers. This helps to explain why suicide bomber campaigns begin but also why 
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they end. If suicide bombers were a product of religion alone, then suicide terror-
ism in countries like Lebanon should not have ended when America withdrew its 
combat forces.  
The future of Iraq is precarious. Americans can better navigate its topology by 
better understanding the country through a cultural sense and not by simply re-
ducing it to a religious or ethnic state. This thesis suggests a simple, e ective strat-
egy to understanding suicide terrorism: Religion is an element in the propagation 
of the phenomenon of suicide bombings; however, religion is neither essential nor 
is it su icient for explanation of such actions.  
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